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ABSTRACT 
In December 2006, the U.S. Army published its new counterinsurgency (COIN) 
Field Manual (FM 3-24).  FM 3-24 is the much-anticipated capstone doctrinal COIN 
guide for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.  Its intent is “to fill a doctrinal gap,” for 
fighting COIN by delivering “a manual that provides principles and guidelines for 
counterinsurgency operations.” The importance of developing a coherent, 
interdisciplinary approach that helps to fill the “doctrinal” and capability gaps facing the 
U.S. military in the asymmetrical warfare spectrum, including COIN, cannot be 
overstated.   In light of this, how well do the new guidelines in FM 3-24 for conducting a 
COIN campaign align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency?  
FM 3-24 outlines U.S. COIN doctrine in the form of strategies called Logical Lines of 
Operation (LLOs).  With this in mind, are there cases in the Middle East where FM 3-
24’s LLOs have been applied and produced their intended effects?  If they were not used 
and the state power’s desired “endstate” was achieved, what strategies were used to 
achieve the COIN campaign objectives?  This thesis assesses the extent to which the field 
manual aligns with insights and practices from historical COIN campaigns in the Middle 
East as well as the new doctrine’s ability to supply the United States with a COIN 
strategy that incorporates insights and conclusions from academia.  Our findings indicate 
that FM 3-24 is a necessary step in developing an effective and coherent U.S. approach to 
COIN.  However, it fails to incorporate some more contemporary social movement 
theory explanations into its strategies.  For example, it fails to recognize the relative 
importance political inclusion in counterinsurgency strategies versus other variables, such 
as security, as a primary means of success in counterinsurgency campaigns.  
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This Chapter begins with a discussion of the new Joint Field Manual (FM) FM 3-
24 Counterinsurgency.  We then examine the structure of this thesis, followed by a 
literature review of Counterinsurgency practices, as well as social mobilization theory.  
Next, we discuss the methodology used in this thesis research project.  We conclude with 
a discussion of the common measures of effectiveness used. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In December, 2006 the U.S. Army published its new counterinsurgency (COIN) 
Field Manual (FM 3-24).  FM 3-24 is the much-anticipated capstone doctrinal COIN 
guide for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.  Its intent is “to fill a doctrinal gap,” for 
fighting COIN by delivering “a manual that provides principles and guidelines for 
counterinsurgency operations.”1  The importance of developing a coherent, 
interdisciplinary approach that helps to fill the “doctrinal” and capability gaps facing the 
U.S. military in the asymmetrical warfare spectrum, including COIN, cannot be 
overstated.   In light of this, how well do the new guidelines in FM 3-24 for conducting a 
COIN campaign align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency?  
Most would argue that this would determine its usefulness, or theoretical power, as a 
guide for those charged with conducting COIN campaigns.   
In numerous COIN campaigns state powers apply strategies, or doctrine, based on 
varying degrees of hard and soft power. 2  Similarly, FM 3-24 outlines U.S. COIN 
doctrine in the form of strategies called Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs).  With this in 
mind, are there cases in the Middle East where FM 3-24’s LLOs have been applied and 
produced their intended effects?  If they were not used and the state power’s desired 
“endstate” was achieved, what strategies were used to achieve the COIN campaign 
                                                 
1 United States Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (Washington D.C.: United States Army, 2006), 
Foreward.  
2 For the purposes of this thesis, the words “state” and “state power” will denote an established 
government with authority based in institutional power that provides it with an inertial quality which is 
contrasted by an insurgent movement which initially lacks an institutional inertia.  
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objectives?  In this thesis we will assess the extent to which the field manual aligns with 
insights and practices from historical COIN campaigns in the Middle East as well as 
assess the new doctrine’s ability to supply the United States with a COIN strategy which 
incorporates insights and conclusions from academia.  
Just as FM 1 and FM 3.0 “[establish] the Army’s keystone doctrine for full 
spectrum operations”3 by providing the foundational principles of U.S. Army maneuver 
warfare that commanders apply to specific operational and tactical situations, FM 3-24 
should be the source from which operational and tactical COIN practices spring.  While 
the new COIN FM acknowledges that “every insurgency is contextual and presents its 
own set of challenges,” the Army intends to garner those “contextual” “lessons learned 
from previous counterinsurgencies…” and “existing interim doctrine and doctrine 
recently developed.”4 Much as with other military doctrine, FM 3-24’s goal is to be a 
usable guide that parsimoniously defines and prescribes COIN strategies that are 
generally applicable. As mentioned above, the FM intends to combine these “lessons 
learned” and doctrine to produce strategies called LLOs for conducting COIN operations.   
 According to FM 3-24 an LLO is “[a] logical line that connects actions on nodes 
and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s).”5  In other words, 
LLOs are the guiding principles for executing COIN operations with associated tasks, or 
sub-objectives, included in each LLO.   One of the FM’s main assertions is that achieving 
these sub-objectives, or “decisive points” are the actions most likely to result in a “secure 
and stable environment.”  See Figure One below for the list of LLOs included in FM 3-
24.6 
As mentioned above, this manual is intended to aggregate applicable COIN 
lessons and practices in order to provide the all-important foundation and guide on which 
military planners and commanders can base their specific operations.  In light of this, 
                                                 
3 Department of the Army, Field Manual No. FM 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
Washington, D.C., 2001. vii. 
4 Ibid., vii. 
5 Ibid., Glossary-6. 
6 Ibid., 5-5. 
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does FM 3-24 provide the best theoretical/doctrinal foundation with a baseline 
operational articulation for U.S. COIN?  It is reasonable to argue that time and 
perceptions will determine the answer.  If Iraq and Afghanistan become states with 
“secure and stable environments” and U.S. forces following the LLOs in FM 3-24 are 
instrumental in establishing this security, then it would be reasonable to assert that the 
LLOs are sound strategies for implementing U.S. COIN theory.  Perhaps a more 
appropriate question to ask regarding the new COIN manual is how effective have the 
LLOs proven to be in the past?   
 
Figure 1.   Logical Lines of Operation with example “decisive points”.7 
                                                 
7 United States Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 (Washington D.C.: United States Army, 2006). 
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B. THESIS STRUCTURE 
First, we define the theoretical foundations of new U.S. COIN doctrine by 
examining the social movement theory (SMT) driving the doctrine and show how it is 
operationalized in some key LLOs in FM 3-24.  We also describe the states’ COIN 
doctrines in our four historical case studies and detail how they were operationalized.  
We compare and contrast the case study doctrines and strategies with current U.S. COIN 
doctrine and LLOs.  In doing this our goal is threefold: first, we intend to accurately 
determine different and common principles in COIN specifically applied in the Middle 
East; second, based on what we believe to be the primary and common measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) of the case studies and current U.S. COIN doctrine (a “secure and 
stable environment”), we intend to determine the possible sufficiency and necessity of 
some LLOs and their supportive sub-objectives, or “decisive points,” in achieving the 
common MOE; third, we discuss the implications of our findings and determine their role 
in recommending changes to the field manual or affirming its relevance as is. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Numerous military, academic, and political theorists/experts proffer answers and 
debate strategies on how the sole remaining superpower should address the challenge of 
COIN.   Most acknowledge that today COIN is a hybrid type of warfare combining an 
age-old cat and mouse game which insurgents and states have engaged in for millennia 
with the globalized world of instant information flow and remarkable technology.  As 
mentioned above, FM 3-24 is the U.S. military’s answer to the doctrinal gap evidenced 
by the difficulties of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF).  In order to develop an effective and interdisciplinary COIN FM the authors of FM 
3-24 relied on some key theoretical foundations regarding rebellion and contentious 
group behavior.  As mentioned, we will discuss the SMT providing the broader 
framework for FM 3-24’s COIN doctrine and its LLOs.  First, in accordance with a broad 




A large body of contemporary scholarship asserts that insurgencies and other 
violent social events, such as revolutions and riots, are extreme examples of what Sidney 
Tarrow calls “contentious collective action” and that they should be studied and 
explained in the context of social movement theory. 8  Likewise, Charles Tilly describes 
“social movements as a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns by 
which ordinary people [make] collective claims on others.”9  While there is considerable 
debate among scholars as to the most significant causes of “contentious collective action” 
occurring outside of the accepted state institutions and with the purpose of overthrowing 
those institutions, it is widely accepted by many scholars that the sufficient and necessary 
causal factors of insurgencies must be conceptualized within SMT as part of a 
contentious political relationship between an authority and a group resisting authority.10 
 We will discuss SMT and its incorporation into FM 3-24 in more detail later, but 
as an initial explanation for the purposes of this thesis, social movements are defined as 
collective, contentious and sustained actions taken by people to challenge another group 
of people based on a claim.  Therefore, in the most basic sense, social movement theories 
seek to explain how, when and why people act collectively in support of or against 
another group of people.  Therefore, SMT provides crucial explanatory power for 
understanding insurgencies and implications for developing effective COIN doctrine.   
                                                 
8  Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 271. 
9  Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1978), 
349. 
10 Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1982), 217. ;Ted Robert Gurr and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of 
International Studies, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Published for the Center of International Studies, 
Princeton University by Princeton University Press, 1970), 421.;Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism : A 
Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 316 ;Mohammed 
M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel : Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003), 253.  Johnson uses a structural explanation in his “social disequilibrium theory” 
to addresses the causative elements and the process of revolution and other anti-state political actions. 
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As John Nagl accurately asserts, there are essentially two strategies that states 
apply to COIN campaigns: “the direct approach” and “the indirect approach.”11  In the 
kinetically-based “direct approach” states use attrition warfare and focus their efforts on 
annihilating the insurgents by killing or capturing them and destroying their operational 
abilities.  Of course, this strategy is rooted in the trinitarian war concepts most notably 
articulated by Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.  Jomini asserted that 
“these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces 
at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory.”12  In fact, the idea of an enemy 
center of gravity came from Clausewitz; it was the concept of schwerpunkt he described 
in On War.  The “direct approach” or, Clausewitzian doctrine, has been the foundation 
for American military strategy, force structuring, and training for decades.  The vast 
majority of US Army FMs are grounded in the basic principle of massing combat power 
to destroy the enemy.13  As mentioned above, the “direct approach” mandates that the 
ability to defeat the enemy is a function of finding his all-important center of gravity, 
focusing all available killing power on that point, and destroying it.  All conventional 
U.S. Army units are built around these core principles.     
Of course, the fundamental assumption of those espousing the “direct approach” 
in COIN is predicated on the state’s ability to find, isolate, and focus its killing power on 
the insurgent’s decisive point which ultimately results in unrecoverable attrition of 
insurgent forces.  Arguably, in light of the current war in Iraq, the most-studied and best 
example of American application of this strategy and its ultimate failure is the Vietnam 
War.  A huge volume of “Vietnam conflict” scholarship critically details the ineffective 
American strategy of applying more force to a decaying political and military situation in 
South Vietnam during this period.14  Most recent COIN scholarship is highly critical of 
                                                 
11  John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife : Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam [Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam], Paperback ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), 249. 
12 Jomini quoted in Nagl, 17.  
13 FM 3-0. Operations. 17 May 2004. 




the “direct approach” and its simplistic, force-oriented principles.  A good example of 
this scholarship is Ahmed S. Hashim’s Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Iraq in 
which he is highly critical of the U.S. Army’s conventional, or “direct approach,” to the 
in Iraq and the Army’s failure to adapt its strategy to the sophisticated Iraqi insurgency.15 
In contrast to “the direct approach,” the “indirect approach” is based on a series of 
more sophisticated assumptions about the nature of insurgencies which logically dictate 
different and more effective COIN strategies.  Nagl asserts that chief among these 
effective counterinsurgency strategies is the requisite division of “the people from the 
insurgents.”16  This principle is the fundamental element of most theories that fall into 
Nagl’s “indirect approach.”  Similar to Nagl, Thomas X. Hammes in The Sling and the 
Stone asserts that COIN is a different kind of war.  According to him, war has evolved 
over the last 70 years.  We have moved from 3rd generation warfare (3GW), or blitzkrieg 
warfare, to 4th generation warfare (4GW) which is centered on the battle of ideas and 
winning the neutral population’s support.17  He asserts that the political will of the 
population should be the focus of operations, not the destruction of enemy forces.  
Hammes does leave a place in 4GW for kinetic operations, but insists that they must be 
used in conjunction with nation building and state reform.  In fact, the “indirect 
approach” and 4GW described by Nagl, Hammes and others involves a methodical 
separation of insurgents from their sources of support in the population, securing the 
population against insurgent threats, an establishment or securing of functional 
government institutions, and the enforcement of the rule of law according to the state.  
These strategies are designed to counter the fundamental principles of insurgent doctrine 
which is mostly based on the “body of strategic thought on ‘protracted war’ developed by 
Mao Zedong in the 1930s and 1940s.”18   
                                                 
15  Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 482. 
16  Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife : Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, 
249. 
17  Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone : On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith 
Press, 2004), 321. 
18 G. H. McCormick, "People’s War" In , ed. James Ciment (New York: Shocken Press, 1999), 1. 
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FM 3-24 attempts to operationalize this requirement through its LLOs in order to 
systematically employ focused strategies that offset insurgent efforts and allow state 
forces to “establish government legitimacy.”19  The fundamental assumption on which 
some of LLOs are based is that Host Nation [HN] legitimacy is partially rooted in the 
preference for the government over the insurgents by the population’s “uncommitted 
middle.”20  As mentioned above, FM 3-24 characterizes victory, or a successful 
counterinsurgency, as one that establishes “a stable and secure environment” which in 
turn results in the “recognition of the legitimacy of the HN government.”21  The 
theoretical underpinnings for this assumption are partly based on social movement 
theory, lessons learned from “previous counterinsurgencies” like the British campaign in 
Malaya in the 1950s, and “relevant combat operations.”22 
While most current scholarship concurs with its assertions that COIN requires the 
methodical application of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies in order to achieve success, 
one could effectively argue, as in the case of Leites and Wolf, that the assumption that the 
battle between state and insurgents is fundamentally “a struggle for the hearts and minds 
of the people” is problematic.23 Instead, insurgencies and COIN campaigns are fights for 
control of resources, or “inputs” such as “recruits, information, shelter, and food…”24 
The “uncommitted middle” may prefer the state over the insurgents, but if the insurgents 
are exerting control of the population through coercion and persuasion and the state 
cannot counter the insurgent’s controls, then the population’s preference for one side or 
the other becomes less important.  According to G. H. McCormick, in a conflict between 
the state and insurgents the “defining operational problem for the insurgents is 
overcoming the conventional military superiority of the state (or occupying power) 
                                                 
19  United States Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, 5-2. 
20 Ibid., 1-15.  
21 Ibid., 5-2 to 5-3. 
22 Ibid., vi. 
23  Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority; an Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts 
(Chicago: Markham Pub. Co, 1970), 174. 
24 Ibid., 32. 
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through an asymmetrical campaign based on the support (and resources) of a constituent 
population.”25  Conversely, the problem for the state is to develop an effective strategy to 
eliminate the elusive insurgents, their support mechanisms within the “constituent 
population” and retain control of the state by means of a counterinsurgency (COIN) 
campaign.    
In light of this and as an indicator of the relative importance of popular preference 
versus control of resources in COIN, an examination of past COIN doctrines and 
campaigns in our case studies should indicate how important winning “hearts and minds” 
may have been in achieving the common MOE (a “secure and stable environment”).  As 
mentioned, FM 3-24 is intended to provide the theoretical foundation for COIN and a 
guide to operationalizing that theory in the LLOs.  Out intention is to use the four Middle 
Eastern case studies in thesis to shed some light on the validity of the FM.  
D. METHODOLOGY   
This thesis is an examination of the FM 3-24.  Using the FM as a COIN theory, 
we will determine if the new FM is relevant as a strategic guide for executing COIN 
operations as specifically outlined in the manual.  The FM clearly states that LLOs must 
be used in cooperation with one another, and that “neglecting objectives along one LLO 
risks creating vulnerable conditions along another that insurgents can exploit.”26  In 
addition and in an apparent contradiction, the FM states that  
[t]hese lines [LLOs] can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or 
simply not used.  LLOs should be used to isolate the insurgency from the 
population, address and correct the root causes of the insurgency, and 
create or reinforce the societal systems required to sustain the legitimacy 
of the HN government. 
We compare and contrast the LLOs outlined in the FM to COIN doctrine and 
strategies of the states in four case studies: the British occupation of Iraq following World 
War I and the resulting Iraqi rebellion against their control; the rebellion by the Zionists 
                                                 
25 McCormick, “People’s War.” 
26  United States Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, 5-2. 
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in Palestine against the British from 1943-48; the French campaign in Algiers from 1954-
62; and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the second or, “al-Aqsa,” Intifada from 
September 2000-2004.  These cases were chosen based on several comparable 
similarities: 1) the state forces possessed a huge force and technology advantage; 2) the 
insurgencies were Middle Eastern and included some religious framing; 3) the state 
forces assumed that technology and force provided a decisive advantage over the 
insurgents; 4) the insurgencies were protracted conflicts that compelled both parties to 
modify tactics and strategies to one degree or another.  While it is important to 
acknowledge some fundamental difference in the cases, for example Israel’s principle 
goal of physically remaining on much of the contested lands in the occupied territories 
and Britain’s desire to retain influence in Iraq while exerting minimal effort, all the states 
had fundamental designs on retaining some significant element of control in the contested 
areas.   
E. THE COMMON MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
As mentioned above, to determine the effectiveness of the LLOs in FM 3-24 and 
the strategies employed by the states in our case studies we must first have a common 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) to assess their success.  As illustrated in Figure One, the 
“end state” for LLOs in FM 3-24 is a “secure and stable environment.”  It is important to 
note that this “end state” is divorced from political or ideological overtones indicating the 
superiority of one political system over another and strictly centered on achieving calm 
conditions that may or may not lead to a democratic state.  With this in mind, we 
delineate the main objectives of the COIN campaigns, or the victory conditions, as 
articulated by the government/forces conducting COIN operations in our case studies. 
However, we also describe the success or failure of the COIN campaigns in each case in 
terms of establishing a “secure and stable environment.”  We believe this is an 
appropriate overall MOE because it is a common goal shared by all the states in our case 





II. FM 3-24: SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, OTHER KEY 
THEORIES AND THE LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATION: 
DISTILLING THE ENIGMATIC RELATIONSHIP  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this section we discuss the key elements of social movement theory (SMT) and 
other theories incorporated into FM 3-24.  We detail the fundamental theoretical social-
science driving the FM’s assertions about peoples’ motivations for starting, joining, or 
supporting insurgencies.  By doing this we illustrate the major influences of these 
theories on the guidance offered to the forces in the field for successfully conducting 
COIN campaigns.  This guidance is articulated in FM 3-24’s LLOs and by briefly 
describing SMT and the other social theories we can analyze how they are manifested in 
these LLOs and better understand their influence on U.S. COIN doctrine.  While the FM 
contains bedrock theories that analyze and attempt to identify the primary causal factors 
of contentious collective actions like insurgency, many of them lack sufficient 
explanatory power.  In general, the deprivation-based frustrations that Ted Robert Gurr 
and Eric Hoffer identify as a primary, or independent variables, from which rebellion 
springs are problematic because they fail to sufficiently consider and incorporate other 
causal factors and intervening variables such as the “political opportunity structure” 
described by Mohamed M. Hafez in his book Why Muslims Rebel.  In addition, the 
alienated and poor individual “true beliver” that Eric Hoffer identifies and the frustrated, 
monolithic Muslim mass that Lewis describes in The Crisis of Islam fail to consider that 
the relatively educated middle class in Muslims states, who are functioning members of 
their societies, compose a large and active part of insurgent groups and that they are 
definitely motivated by issues beyond religion.  Still, by including these theories the FM 
moves U.S. COIN doctrine well beyond the rudimentary approaches and theories that 
characterized it just three year ago.   
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B. DEFINING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND ITS RELEVANT 
COMPONENTS FOR U.S. COIN DOCTRINE 
Before we examine the elements of social movement theories employed in FM 3-
24, we must establish a common working definition of social movement and its relevant 
components for the purposes this thesis.  It is important to acknowledgement that the 
definitions applied here are narrow with respect to the volume and sophistication of 
various social movement theories.  Nonetheless, our goal is to establish a set of 
parsimonious definitions that are generally accepted by scholars and are usable for 
understanding the SMTs included in FM 3-24.   
Charles Tilly describes “social movements as a series of contentious 
performances, displays and campaigns by which ordinary people [make] collective 
claims on others.”27 Similarly, Sydney Tarrow defines social movements as “those 
sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and 
resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained 
challenges against powerful opponents.”28  Tarrow also asserts that social movements 
“fall within the broader universe of contentious politics” and that “the irreducible act that 
lies at the base of all social movements, protests and revolutions is contentious collective 
action.”29  Therefore, we define social movements as collective, contentious and 
sustained actions taken by people to challenge another group of people based on a claim.  
Therefore, in the most basic sense, social movement theories seek to explain how, when 
and why people act collectively in support of or against another group of people.  In this 
respect social scientists are attempting to scientifically determine the dependent, 
independent and intervening variables that are generally applicable to most, if not all, 
cases of “contentious collective action.”  SMT seeks to explain the necessary and 
sufficient causal factors common to insurgencies as well as other contentious mass 
movements. 
                                                 
27  Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004 (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 3. 
28  Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2. 




Mobilization in the social movement context encompasses the “how” and “why” 
of social movement theory.  We will again draw from Tilly for our explanation.  He 
asserts that mobilization is one of “five big components” which make up collective 
action: “interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action itself.”30  
According to Tilly, “Mobilization is the process by which a group acquires collective 
control over the resources needed for action.  Those resources may be labor, goods, 
weapons, votes, and any number of things, just as long as they are usable in acting on 
shared interests.31  Tilly’s definition includes the reason, or “why,” of social movement 
theory because groups must have defined “shared interests” which provide the motivation 
for sustained action.  Additionally, his definition includes the “how” of social movement 
theory because the very act of mobilization means collecting and using resources in 
support of a claim.  Tilly’s mobilization definition is accurately descriptive, generally 
acceptable to most social scientists, and we will use it as our definition of mobilization in 
this thesis.  
2. Repertoires, Framing and the Agent 
Next, we will briefly examine three important elements of mobilization that are 
also part of the “how” and the “why” of SMT: repertoires, framing, and the agent.  A 
repertoire, as part of mobilization, is the way in which groups act collectively.  Riots, 
protests, and strikes are examples of repertoires.  Charles Tilly details the finer elements 
of “social movement repertoires” in his book Social Movements, 1768–2004.  But, for our 
purposes, a repertoire is an integral part of mobilization which is an element of the “how” 
in SMT.  McAdam, McCarthy and Zaid assert that “[a]t a minimum people need to feel 
both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, 
they can redress the problem… [c]onditioning the presence or absence of these 
perceptions is that complex of social dynamics – collective attribution, social 
                                                 
30 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 7. 
31 Ibid., 7. 
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construction – that David Snow and various of his colleagues (Snow et al. 1986: Snow 
and Benford, 1988) have referred to as framing processes.”32  Simply put, framing 
articulates a message, or call to action, to a group which convinces them to act.  An 
example of framing is the recruiting slogan used by the U.S. Marine Corps: “The few, the 
proud, the Marines.”  This frame has been a very powerful motivator that has inspired 
thousands of young men and women to become Marines.  The tool for delivering a 
framed message is often a person, or agent, who frames a message, or cause, in a nuanced 
manner appropriate for different social environments and also incorporates local interests 
into a larger cause.  The military recruiter is an example of an agent.  
3. Opportunity 
Next, we must consider the “when” of social movement theory which is the 
explanation of combined conditions, timing, and other factors that facilitate the rise of 
“contentious collective action.”  The “when” is a function of opportunity.  In Tilly’s 
estimation “[o]pportunity concerns the relationship between the group and the world 
around it.”33  More precisely, opportunity is the space and time in which a group is 
capable of organizing and acting, or mobilizing, in support of its claim.  Most social 
movement scholars refer to a group’s ability to mobilize in a state as a function of 
political opportunity which is composed of four main factors according to Doug 
McAdam: “(1) relative openness of the institutionalized political system; (2) instability of 
elite alignments; (3) presence of elite allies; and (4) the state’s reduced capacity or 
propensity for repression.”34  If we combine these factors with solid organizational 
leaders who are capable of managing the other mobilizing elements discussed above, than 
a group can take advantage of the opportunity to collectively act against state institutions.  
While this oversimplifies the concept of opportunity, the assertion that opportunity is the 
                                                 
32  Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald  N., Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge England ; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5. 
33  Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 7. 
34  McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements : Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, 25. 
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time and space in which a group can collectively act sufficiently captures the concept for 
our purposes.  Based on the concepts detailed above, it is reasonable to assert that SMTs 
are extremely important in understanding the fundamental nature of insurgencies because 
they attempt to scientifically analyze and explain the causal relationships between 
different variables that are the connective social tissue between contention and violence 
in societies.  With this in mind, any effort to understand and then combat insurgencies 
should start with the essential elements conceptualized in SMT.  Indeed, FM 3-24 clearly 
asserts this: “Knowledge of the history and principles of insurgency and COIN provides a 
solid foundation that informed leaders can use to assess insurgencies. This knowledge is 
also invaluable to leaders deciding what instruments of national power to employ against 
these threats.”35  With this in mind, we will discuss the elements of major SMTs included 
in FM 3-24. 
C.  MAJOR ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND OTHER 
KEY THEORIES IN FM 3-24 
1. Relative Deprivation Theory: Why Men Rebel by Ted Robert Gurr 
Relative deprivation theory is one of the more established branches of social 
movement theory incorporated into FM 3-24 which generalizes about the causes of 
contentious collective political action.  Ted Robert Gurr defines relative deprivation and 
its impact on society in his book Why Men Rebel.  While Gurr’s theory has significant 
merit it fails to sufficiently incorporate the role of political entrepreneurs as the agents of 
change and organizers of collective contentious action.  Most of these political 
entrepreneurs come from the educated middle class who are relatively less deprived than 
the poor who lack the basic organizational capacity to conduct sustained contentious 
collective action.    
 
                                                 
35  United States Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, vi. 
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In this work Gurr maintains that contentious collective political violence is based 
on 
a perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value 
capabilities.  Value expectations are the goods and conditions they think 
they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means 
available to them.  Societal conditions that increase the average level or 
intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities increase the 
intensity of discontent...36 use “quote” style for all quotes 
Furthermore, Gurr maintains that “[d]eprivation-induced discontent is a general 
spur to action” which implies sufficient causality for rebellion and other forms of 
political violence in states plagued by extreme socio-economic disparities.  In fact, “the 
greater the intensity of discontent, the more likely is violence.”37  In addition, Gurr 
asserts that the degree of political violence focused against the state by groups resisting it 
is subject to “[s]ocietal variables” such as cultural “sanctions for overt aggression,” the 
varying “success of past political violence, the articulation and dissemination of symbolic 
appeals justifying violence, the legitimacy of their political system, and the kinds of 
responses it makes and has made to relative deprivation.”38 
Gurr’s structural theory incorporates the previously defined elements of 
mobilization: the “why,” which are the elative deprivations that sectors of societies 
perceive and are in turn framed by agents who provide the “articulation and 
dissemination of symbolic appeals justifying violence.”39  Gurr also explains the “how,” 





                                                 
36 Gurr and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International 
Studies, Why Men Rebel, 12. 
37 Ibid., 12. 
38 Ibid., 13. 
39 Ibid., 13. 
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“internal war.”  Finally, he asserts that the “when” is a function of the “social variables” 
(political opportunity) such as the repressive capacity of the state or the organizational 
abilities of resistance groups.40   
2. The Nature and Appeal of Mass Movements: The True Believer by 
Eric Hoffer 
Initially published in 1951, The True Believer discusses a specific type of 
deprivation as a motivation for individual participation in contentious collective action 
and the frustrated and alienated people who join these groups.  Hoffer’s theory is 
centered on an individual’s isolation from society and his perceived deprivation.  In 
contrast to Hoffer’s assertions, more recent research indicates that, many individuals who 
participate in contentious social movements, particularly in Muslim states, are deeply 
connected to their societies.  As Quinton Wiktorowicz notes, these individuals and the 
organizations they join  
are not merely psychological coping mechanisms; they are often explicitly 
focused and directed toward the political arena.  In addition, participants 
are not “dysfunctional” individuals seeking psychological comfort, but 
instead frequently represent educated and well-adjusted members of 
society.41    
As mentioned above, Hoffer asserts that people are spurred to join mass 
movements mostly by a sense of frustration based on a lack “of opportunity for self-
advancement.”42  He says that 
[w]here self-advancement cannot, or is not allowed to, serve as a driving 
force, other sources of enthusiasm have to be found if momentous 
changes, such as the awakening and renovation of stagnant society or 
radical reforms in the character and pattern of life of a community, are to 
                                                 
40 While our description of Gurr’s theory does not include the entire sophistication of his arguments, it 
accurately and sufficiently illustrates his generalizations about “why men rebel” which are important 
theoretical foundations of U.S. COIN doctrine in FM 3-24s. 
41  Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism : A Social Movement Theory Approach, 9. 
42  Eric Hoffer, The True Believer : Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, 1st Perennial classics 
ed., 2002), 3. 
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be realized and perpetuated.  Religious, revolutionary, and nationalist 
movements serve as generating plants of general enthusiasm.43 
In addition, Hoffer contends that “frustrations” of various groups (“The Poor, Misfits, 
The Inordinately Selfish, The Ambitious Facing Unlimited Opportunities, Minorities, The 
Bored, and The Sinners”) render them particularly susceptible to the lure of contentious 
political groups who use violence to resist the state.  He claims that some people who 
commit themselves to violent social movements and who go through an “effacement of 
individual separateness” to the degree that “[h]is joys and sorrows, his pride and 
confidence must spring from the fortunes and capacities of the group rather than from his 
individual prospects and abilities” constitute the “true beliver[s].”44  Hoffer maintains 
that a “true believer” shares a willingness to sacrifice all because “as long as [the 
collective] body lives he cannot really die.”45   
Just as Gurr later asserts in Why Men Rebel, Hoffer maintains that people are 
mobilized by their frustrations.  However, these frustrations and the act of “undermining 
the existing institutions, of familiarizing the masses with the idea of change…can be done 
only by men who are, first and foremost, talkers or writers…”46  In other words, a claim 
must be framed by an agent.  Hoffer maintains that “the militant man of words prepares 
the ground for the rise of mass movement” which partially sets the stage (political 
opportunity) for the “true believer[s]” to act.  In social scientific terms and based on 
Hoffer’s assertions, political opportunity, the agent, and framing are all necessary, but 
not sufficient, causal factors for frustration-based individual and mass violence to occur.  
This is important point to understand.  Individuals can be frustrated for various reasons 
and agents can frame these frustrations in mobilizing terms, but the actual cases when all 
of these factors align to produce sustained contentious political action are infrequent.   
                                                 
43 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer : Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, 1st Perennial classics 
ed., 2002), 3. 
44 Ibid., 62.
45 Ibid., 61. 
46 Ibid., 129. 
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Hoffer’s assertions about the conditions that produce the “true believer” are important to 
understand because they are part of the theoretical foundation of U.S. COIN doctrine in 
FM 3-24.  However, what is more important to understand is that these conditions and the 
act of sustained contentious political actions with true believers completely surrendering 
their identity to the movements are infrequent and contingent on numerous intervening 
variables as we have alluded to above.        
3. Explanations for Global Jihadism: Understanding Terror Networks 
by Marc Sageman 
Marc Sageman uses Al Qaeda as a case study to generalize about the internal 
dynamics of growth in transnational terrorists organizations.  According to Sageman, 
while we can find evidence supporting Gurr’s social deprivation theory as a partial source 
of Al Qaeda’s membership, this is less of a mobilizing factor than the a common belief 
among members that “iniquitous” governments ruling predominantly Muslim countries, 
Saudi Arabia in particular, must be forcibly removed “so that an Islamic government 
would form spontaneously.”47 Additionally, what he calls “Salafi Jihadi” terrorist 
ideology is framed in a claim that the United States (or the “far enemy”) is a clear threat 
to the Muslim world and by “occupying” Arab/Muslim lands it has made a clear 
declaration of war on Allah, his Messenger and Muslims.”48  The majority of this 
framing is based on huge volumes of work produced by “Islamists” like Sayid Qutb who, 
among other things, assert that the Muslim world has slipped back into an age of 
ignorance (jahiliyya) and the corrupt, repressive, ineffectual ruling governments of the 
Muslim world are evidence of this.  
Sageman maintains that the “Salafi Jihadist” framing mentioned above combined 
with members of Al Qaeda believing that the repressive “apostate government[s] would 
never voluntarily relinquish power” limited the political opportunity for Jihadists to resist 
the corruption their home countries.  Consequently, many Al Qaeda members chose to 
                                                 
47  Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 17. 
48 Ibid., 19. 
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pursue extra-institutional, transnational violent action which accounts for the 
international composition of the organization.  A logical implication from Sageman’s 
assertions is that repression, while not sufficient, is a necessary causal condition for the 
transnational and violent nature, or the “why” and “how” of Al Qaeda’s infamous 
terrorist operations.  
An interesting fact that Sageman discusses in his book is that 60% of the 172 Al 
Qaeda members he used for his study had at least a year of college.  In addition, their 
areas of study were in hard sciences like engineering.  This fact contradicts some popular 
notions asserting terrorists predominantly come from deprived backgrounds.  Admittedly, 
this is an oversimplification of Sageman’s theories.  But, Sageman’s evidence seems to 
diminish the relative causal potency of social-economic disparity for mobilizing groups of 
people into collective political violence.  The important thing to understand here is that 
Sageman is using a social science approach to Global Jihadism which is centered on 
determining causality based on analysis of data from the field.  This is key theoretical 
material that has been incorporated into the LLOs of FM 3-24.  As we shall see the LLOs 
attempt to develop strategies that are designed to respond to more than economic 
deprivation and individual alienation.  They include political reconciliation as a crucial 
element of COIN.  This is clearly based on contributions from Sageman and others who 
have analyzed these causal factors.    
4. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror by Bernard Lewis 
In The Crisis of Islam Bernard Lewis attempts to describe historical and cultural 
underpinnings of transnational Islamist terrorism.  His basic assertion is that “Islamic 
history, for the Muslims, has an important religious and also legal significance, since it 
reflects the working out of God’s purpose for His community-those that accept the 
teachings of Islam and obey its law.49  This sense of history coupled with American 
presence on Muslim soil, support for Israel and repressive governments in predominantly 
                                                 
49 Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror, Modern Library ed. (New York: 
Modern Library, 2003), xix. 
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Muslim countries in the Middle East has produced resentment among a significant 
portion of the Muslim world.  In addition, Lewis maintains that historical examples of 
American interference in Muslim countries’ domestic affairs such as the U.S. “overthrow 
of the Mosaddeq government in 1953, demonstrates a long and threatening record of 
American aggression in the Muslim world.50  Lewis asserts that an additional element of 
the perceived American threat is that “[b]roadly speaking, Muslim fundamentalists are 
those who feel that the troubles with the Muslim world at the present time are the result 
not of insufficient modernization but of excessive modernization, which they see as a 
betrayal of authentic Islamic values.”51  Islamists use this frame to mobilize frustrated 
and suspicious Muslims to attack America (“the great Satan”) and “the false and 
renegade Muslims who rule the countries of the Islamic world and who have imported 
and imposed the infidel ways on Muslim peoples.52 
Finally, similar to other SMTs explaining collective political violence included in 
FM 3-24, we have not fully detailed Lewis’ arguments concerning what he describes as 
the tendency for some Muslims “to define the struggle, and sometimes the enemy, in 
religious terms and to see American troops…as infidel invaders and occupiers.”53  
However, we have detailed the significant components of his contentions about the roots 
of Islamist-based mobilization to see how they influence American COIN doctrine as 
articulated in FM 3-24.  It is important to acknowledge that many Middle Eastern 
scholars are critical of Lewis’ arguments and he is considered by many in the field to be 
part of the “Orientalist” population of Middle Eastern academics.  This issue was 
described by Edward Said in his 1978 book Orientalism.  According to Said, 
“Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the 
Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference with its 
weakness…As a cultural apparatus Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-
                                                 
50 Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror, Modern Library ed. (New York: 
Modern Library, 2003),  73. 
51 Ibid., 134.
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., xxxii. 
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to-truth, and knowledge.”54  The criticism is important to understand because it questions 
the validity of Lewis’ arguments based on assertions that “Orientalists” lack scientific 
objectivity because their theories are muddled by inaccurate assumptions regarding 
Middle Eastern society.  In fact, it is accurate to assert that many contemporary Middle 
East scholars do not consider “Orientalist” theories applicable in terms of analyzing and 
explaining contentious political violence in the Middle East.  Regardless of the debate, 
Lewis is a noted author and his influence of U.S. COIN doctrine and Middle Eastern 
policy is very important. 
The works discussed in this section certainly do not encompass the entire body of 
SMT and other social theories included in FM 3-24.  However, as mentioned above, it is 
reasonable to assert that they illustrate the core social science theories employed in the 
FM.  These theories have been crucial in forming U.S. COIN doctrine, thus warranting 
their selection in comparison to some others that could have been included in our 
discussion.  With this in mind we now illustrate one way these theories were employed in 
FM 3-24 by examining their influence on the FMs LLOs. 
C. THE LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATION: APPLICATION OF SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT THEORY IN U.S. COIN DOCTRINE 
According to FM 3-24 “[c]ommanders use LLOs to visualize, describe and direct 
operations when positional reference to enemy forces has little relevance.“55  The LLOs 
are the key to successful counterinsurgency.  They formalize the paradigmatic shift from 
conventional Army doctrine and are intended to give commanders the ability to focus 
their forces’ efforts in the complex COIN environment.  In this section we will describe 
the LLOs and the influence of the SMTs discussed previously on them.  The LLOs 
manifest U.S. COIN doctrine in clear and parsimonious terms and illustrate the U.S. 
COIN doctrine’s interdisciplinary nature.  Additionally, the LLOs highlight the variables, 
or themes, that the FM’s authors consider to be most crucial in successful COIN 
                                                 
54 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 219. 
55  United States Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, 5-3. 
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campaigns.  As we will see these variables are not confined to one LLO and thus are 
generally applicable and relative importance in COIN efforts.  
1.  A Brief Definition of the LLOs 
As Figure 1 indicates the LLOs are conceptually centered on the influencing the 
“attitude of the populace” rather than the enemy.  The successful “End State” of a COIN 
campaign is defined by a public attitude predominantly supporting or neutral to the 
government rather than destruction of the enemy.  This is a major departure from 
traditional U.S. military “conventional war” doctrine that has been the theoretical engine 
driving American training, force structure and strategy for decades.   
According to the FM, the LLOs depicted in Figure One are crucial for success.  
Yet, they are far from fixed doctrinal axioms that constrain commanders.  As the FM 
indicates,  
[t]hese lines [LLOs] can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or 
simply not used.  LLOs should be used to isolate the insurgency from the 
population, address and correct the root causes of the insurgency, and 
create or reinforce the societal systems required to sustain the legitimacy 
of the HN government.56 
 
 
                                                 




Figure 2.   The Logical Lines of Operation in a Counterinsurgency.57 
 
The LLOs are “similar to the strands of a rope” that are selected by the commander and 
woven together to support the “overall operation.”  Additionally, commanders constantly 
employ Information Operations (IO) to “strengthen” the effects of the LLOs by 
“highlighting the successes along each one.”58  Before proceeding we will define the 
LLOs listed in Figure One.  This will illustrate how SMT is integrated into specific LLOs 
and broader SMT themes used by the FM’s authors in more than one LLO. 
a. Combat Operations/Civil Security Operations:  
These operations are most familiar to military commanders.  While these 
operations are necessary in many COIN campaigns, the manual stresses some key 
considerations which are indicative of SMT’s specific integration into this LLO and its 
broader influence which stresses non lethal operations over lethal ones because of the 
effects on public perception and ultimately the success of the COIN campaign.  In this 
LLO forces may “conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations.”  
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All of these operations fall into the Army’s “full spectrum” category.59  Significantly 
however, the “Civil Security Operations” portion of this LLO is the primary focus 
whenever possible.  The FM emphasizes this: 
[c]ombat operations must therefore be executed with an appropriate level 
of restraint to minimize or avoid injuring innocent people.  Not only is 
there a moral basis for the use of restraint or measured force; there are 
practical reasons as well.  Needlessly harming innocents can turn the 
populace against the COIN effort.60 
This passage illustrates the fundamental principle that public security and 
perception are the center of gravity for these operations rather instead of destroying the 
enemy.  Public security and the COIN forces’ “fluidity of action” are the most crucial 
elements of this LLO.  In addition, agile, small units that operate close to the public and 
“glean the maximum amount of quality information” about insurgents are the optimum 
force for executing this LLO according to the FM.61  While this is an obvious point to 
most COIN students and practitioners, it is diametrically opposed to conventional Army 
war-fighting doctrine. More importantly, FM 3-24 emphasizes some very non-lethal and 
non-combat related “considerations” for commanders employing this LLO which are 
based on SMT.  In effect, the “Considerations for developing the combat operations/civil 
security operations LLO” identify tasks that commanders should integrate into their 
COIN operations.  The tasks illustrate the authors’ awareness of heavy handed military 
operations can provide opportunity for an agent to frame negatively and turn the public 
against the COIN force.  This is beyond the obvious “collateral damage” that often results 
from kinetic operations.  The FM maintains that commanders should “[c]onsider how the 
population might react when planning tactical situations” like “traffic control points 
(TCPs)” which are generally disruptive and can potentially alienate the COIN force from 
the public.62 
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Additionally, commanders are urged to “[s]upport efforts to disarm, 
demobilize, and reintegrate into society members of armed groups outside of government 
control.”63This guidance clearly places emphasis on reintegration of society over defeat 
of the enemy.  In order to “demobilize” groups, one must first understand what 
mobilization is and the causes of it.  Of course, SMT provides is the theoretical 
framework for this LLO and it is the foundation for imperatives included in it like the one 
discussed above.   
b. Train and Employ Host-Nation Security Forces.   
This LLO based on the fundamental assertion that “the host nation must 
secure its own people.”64  Again, this LLO incorporates an inherent philosophy that 
understanding and respecting the host-nation’s culture.  According to the 
“Considerations” for employing this LLO, commanders are urged to “[t]ake a 
comprehensive approach” to planning and implementing training strategies for 
developing and employing the host-nation’s security forces.  Commanders are urged to 
integrate civic, military and political leaders into developing these programs with the dual 
goals of developing a capable force that is able to “achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the 
populace.”65  However, commanders are also cautioned “not to tolerate abuses” by the 
security forces.66  These considerations are based on an understanding of contentious 
political action’s causative variables that Gurr, Hoffer and others describe in their works.  
Continuing the theme of societal reintegration in contrast to defeating an enemy as an 
overarching theme, host-nations are encouraged to “establish reparation or amnesty 
program[s] to allow insurgents an alternative to the insurgency.”67The FM clearly relies 
on tactics for resolving “[d]eprivation-induced discontent” as a major theoretical 
framework for its prescriptions.  It is also significant that the majority of the 
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“considerations” for developing host-nation forces are focused on enhancing state’s 
ability to secure the population and maintain the rule of law as opposed defeating the 
enemy. 
c.  Establish or Restore Essential Services.   
Similarly to the others, this LLO is clearly rooted in addressing the needs 
and grievances of the population.  Beyond the obvious benefits to COIN and host-nation 
forces efforts’ to counter the insurgency, when the population’s basic needs (e x: water, 
electricity, medical) are being met, this LLO provides COIN and host-nation forces with 
another opportunity to integrate society.  The “Considerations” for this LLO urge 
commanders to “[u]se as much local leadership, talent, and labor as soon as possible.”68  
Just as in other LLOs, some of the main imperatives of this LLO are rooted in 
understanding, addressing and shaping public perceptions and expectations.  Similar to 
above-mentioned LLOs, commanders are urged to “appreciate local preferences” and 
help “the populace understand what is possible” when establishing or restoring “essential 
services.”69  Also, the ability of the host-nation to supply these services in a fair and 
efficient way is a clear demonstration of its control of the country and the rule of law 
which are essential for host-nation governments to establish and retain legitimacy.  This 
is clear evidence that this LLO, like the others, is based on addressing SMT’s casual 
variables specific to it and focusing commanders on broader SMT themes like legitimacy, 
public perception, and expectations.  
d. Support Development of Better Governance.   
According to the FM: 
[t]his LLO relates to the HN [host-nation] government’s ability to gather 
and distribute resources while providing direction and control of 
society…Good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve 
legitimacy of the HN government.  When well executed, these actions  
 
                                                 




may eliminate the root causes of the insurgency.  Governance activities are 
among the most important of all in establishing lasting stability for a 
region or nation.70 
 
This LLO, like the others, is rooted in addressing and repairing the divisions in a society 
that are produced by the conditions Gurr, Hoffer and others describe.  The 
“Considerations” in this LLO urge commanders to “help (or encourage) the host-nation 
government to remove or reduce genuine grievances, expose imaginary ones, and resolve 
contradictions…”71Again, we see the themes of reintegration and expectation and 
perception management as the overarching themes that are applicable to this LLO and the 
others.  The decisive factors for successfully executing this LLO and the others are 
clearly derived from SMT.  Commanders must find the roots of the insurgency, some of 
which are based perceived and actual exclusion from the government, and “[c]reate a 
system for citizens to pursue redress for perceived wrongs by authorities.”72 
e. Support Economic Development   
The FM maintains that there are “short- and long-term aspects to this 
LLO.”73Commanders must help develop strategies to address “immediate problems, such 
as large-scale unemployment…” and facilitate “indigenous, robust, and broad economic 
activity” as part of an extended economic growth strategy.  Again, employing this LLO 
has benefits and effects beyond those related to the host-nation economy.  Employment 
not only provides citizens with a means to care for their families, it also promotes 
government legitimacy and undermines the “false promises offered by the insurgents.”74  
An implication of successful economic development is that public expectations of the 
eventual success of COIN force and host-nation government’s COIN campaign will be 
more likely.  Of course, host-nation and COIN force failures in this LLO serve to bolster 
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expectations of the insurgents’ power and likelihood of victory.  In the broadest sense and 
in accordance with “relative deprivation theory,” many people will act out of economic 
need/frustration and support the side who they expect will win in an insurgency in order 
to simply better their lives.  Supporting economic development does much to shape the 
populations expectations and attitude. 
f.  Information Operations (IO)   
According to FM 3-24 the “IO” LLO may often be the decisive 
LLO.”75Among other things, IO is intended to “[m]anage the populace’s expectations 
regarding what counterinsurgents can achieve.”76  IO is the way the COIN forces and 
host-nation governments can “discredit” the insurgents’ claims, publicize host-nation 
achievements.“  In other words, “[w]hen effectively used, IO address the subject of the 
root causes that insurgents use to gain support.”77  According to the FM’s IO 
“Considerations,” IO should provide “the populace some way to voice their opinions and 
grievances…;” help “[d]etermine a populations relative lines of loyalty as accurately as 
possible,” and encourage “host-nation leaders to provide a forum for initiating a dialog 
with the opposition.”78  While this certainly doesn’t cover the full spectrum of IO’s 
purposes in COIN, it illustrates the main SMT themes running through all the LLOs we 
have discussed.  As we can see managing perceptions and expectations are key tasks in 
this LLO as well as deligitimize the insurgents and legitimizing the host-nation 
government.  In addition, the focus of this LLO is also on reintegration of the population.  
These are all key and basic elements of SMT and it would appear that the authors of FM 
3-24 believe that SMT identifies the primary causes of insurgence and therefore they 
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III. BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY: SMALL WARS AND 
IMPERIAL POLICING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we discuss the evolution of British COIN doctrine and highlight 
the key concepts governing it during the first half of the twentieth century.  We then 
examine two British COIN campaigns: the 1920 Iraqi rebellion and the Zionist revolt in 
Palestine in 1945.  We briefly recount the major events of these insurgencies to provide 
the proper background and clarification of the objectives of the British COIN campaigns.  
Next, we focus on specific British tactics employed in each campaign and determine their 
effectiveness in achieving the state’s declared objectives and the common MOE.  Finally, 
we discuss where the LLOs in FM 3-24 align with British COIN practices and the 
implications of the similarities and differences between British and U.S. COIN.  
The evidence illustrates the conflicted nature of British COIN doctrine in the early 
20th century and the impact of these contradictory concepts on the British COIN 
campaigns in Iraq and Palestine as well as the role of these campaigns in the evolution of 
British COIN.  Rooted in the “small wars” doctrine and the “white man’s burden” 
concept of the 19th century, British COIN doctrine evolved over the course of five 
decades through the concepts of “small wars” against external threats and “imperial 
policing” of the empire until it matured into an effective set of COIN principles that were 
refined and implemented in the noted Malayan campaign.  As the case studies indicate, 
the British employed some tactics and strategies which are incorporated into the LLOs of 
contemporary U.S. COIN doctrine.  In both campaigns, they struggled to reconcile 
effective COIN imperatives such as separating insurgents from innocent civilians with 
the perceived effectiveness of “crushing resistance in colonies by the most expeditious 
methods.”79   
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During the early 20th century, the British discovered effective tactics and strategies 
for achieving their objectives in COIN campaigns from which they developed a more 
refined sense of the causal dynamics in insurgency.  In this respect, some British military 
leaders were aware of the necessary conditions for success in COIN such as addressing 
the host nation populations’ grievances.  In fact, both case studies have examples of 
British attempts to address these causal issues.  However, in the case of Iraq, these efforts 
were clouded by the flawed 19th-centurey concepts and political pressures that diluted 
British progress in this area and pushed the British to find, what they considered, an 
expedient military and political solution.  This, combined with domestic Iraqi issues, 
resulted in anything but a stable and secures state.  In the case of the Zionist rebellion, the 
British command structure was plagued by internal struggles for strategic direction which 
was endemic to the conceptual evolution of British COIN.  This resulted in strategic 
confusion and operational shifts in the campaign that produced operations that were 
generally considered punitive by the population and lacked the proper integration of 
intelligence and political strategy to make them effective.  In addition, the British lacked 
the political leverage to coerce or co-opt the Zionists into compromising on their 
objectives which would have almost certainly doomed their campaign to failure even if 
they had employed effective COIN tactics and strategies.  In both cases, the British 
victory conditions were defined by the establishment or “restoration of law and order.”80  
It is on this significant point that British and U.S. COIN doctrine align.  The common 
MOE (a secure and stable environment) is an objective shared by both states in COIN 
campaigns.  In other words, both British and American approaches to COIN put a 
premium on order.  Order produces political opportunity of HN governments and COIN 
forces to establish and increase government legitimacy.  However, as the evidence 
indicates, order does not always equate to sustained stability or legitimacy of the HN 
government. 
Much as the U.S. military has had to adapt its conventional war thinking to 
asymmetrical warfare in 21st century, the British were forced to adjust their concepts 
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throughout the 20th century.  In both the British and American cases, the learning and 
institutional changes occurred while the countries were still fighting.  For the British, this 
process took fifty years before they learned the lessons and developed what is considered 
an effective COIN doctrine by most.  The United States does not have fifty years to learn 
from its mistakes in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Therefore, it would seem prudent to assess the 
effectiveness of our COIN doctrine by comparing the approaches detailed in this Chapter. 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH COIN DOCTRINE IN THE EARLY 20TH 
CENTURY: A REVIEW OF ITS KEY INFLUENCES AND ELEMENTS 
In nearly every corner of the globe, the British have fought in conflicts ranging 
from small police actions to protracted campaigns with large armies fighting major 
battles.  Insurgencies have composed a sizable portion of these conflicts and 
consequently they have had substantial impact on British military doctrine and foreign 
policy.  Perhaps more than any other kind of conflict, insurgencies created tactical, 
operational, strategic and political challenges that shaped the British military and the 
guiding principles governing its doctrine.  In this context, British COIN theory and 
practice have essentially been evolutionary process.   
As with many evolutionary processes, the developmental phases of British COIN 
doctrine overlapped.  In fact, throughout the first half of the 20th century, competing ideas 
of the 19th-century “small wars” and early 20th-centurey “imperial policing” doctrines 
were regularly and simultaneously employed in the same theater of operation.  We will 
discuss these concepts in detail below.  The important point to understand about this 
evolutionary process is that the practical and theoretical overlaps render attempts at 
pinpointing absolute temporal, theoretical and practical divisions of these strategies 
inadequate for understanding British COIN doctrine and its application during the Iraqi 
and Zionist rebellions.  A more productive approach to examining British COIN doctrine 
during these periods is to describe the conceptual roots and fundamental elements of the 
“small wars” and “imperial policing” doctrines.  These principles and their application 
were in full flux during much of this time.  In general, the changes were a product of 
concurrent international political maturations, conceptual shifts in British leadership, 
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economic pressures on the British, and lessons learned from the field in various parts of 
the world.  Fundamentally, it appears that Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl’s assertion that 
“doctrinal change is in many ways a trailing indicator of institutional learning” is correct 
in the case of British adaptations to irregular warfare challenges during this period.81  
In his book British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 Thomas R. Mockaitis contends 
that an “absence of an extensive body of official [British] literature on counterinsurgency 
prior to the 1960s has led many observers to the mistaken conclusion that lessons were 
not being absorbed and transmitted.”82  However, there is considerable evidence that the 
British were formalizing doctrine and attempting institutional reforms in response to 
insurgencies during this period.  But, as Mockaitis contends, these efforts were not 
condensed and articulated in a unified doctrine.  Instead, military theorists authored 
distinct publications in response to particular insurgencies.  While the British lacked a 
truly cohesive COIN doctrine during this period, according to Mockaitis, the “conduct of 
internal-security operations from Ireland to Malaya were based on three broad 
principles…”83  These were: employ minimum force to suppress disorders, assure “close 
cooperation between all branches of the civil government and the military” in COIN 
campaigns, and emphasize that military units “had to dispense with conventional tactics 
and adopt a highly decentralized approach[es] to combating irregulars.”84  These were 
principles the British developed over a fifty-year period that included two world wars, 
several insurgencies and which were employed within the transition from the “small 
wars” to the “imperial policing” concept.  All of these experiences had profound altering 
effects on British military, political and economic aspirations.  In turn, this affected 
military doctrine and strategy.  Again, it is important to understand that the three 
principles Mockaitis describes were “diffuse assumptions shaping the conduct of 
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operations.”85  They were only coalesced into a comprehensive strategy during the 
British COIN campaign in Malaya which many consider to be the contemporary standard 
of a successful COIN model.   
In the process of developing their COIN doctrine in the early 20th century the 
British first struggled with defining the nature of insurgencies which, in turn, mostly 
determined the nature of their responses to them in a changing world.  One important 
issue influencing British responses to “disorder” at the dawn of the 20th century was the 
British shift from treating many insurgencies as external incidents, or “small wars’ in 
unconquered and uncivilized areas to addressing insurgencies as internal issues of the 
empire, or “policing the empire.”  According to Mockaitis,  
the disappearance of the last open spots on the maps of Africa and Asia in 
the race for colonies meant that future conflicts, with the exception of the 
Northwest Frontier of India, would take place within the empire.  They 
would thus be considered civil unrest rather than war.86   
 
In general, colonial expansion for European powers paused at the conclusion of 
the 19th century.  The written articulation of the doctrine guiding British conduct during 
this period, which included conflicts with “irregulars,” was C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars.  
First published in 1896, Small Wars was intended to “give a sketch of the principles and 
practice of small wars as regards strategy and tactics, and broad rules which govern the 
conduct of operations in hostilities against adversaries of whom modern works on the 
military art seldom take account.”87  Callwell explained that “small wars” were military 
operations “undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the 
world where armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in open 
field...”88  In addition, many times a “small war” against an enemy who had “no king to 
conquer, no capital to seize, no organized army to overthrow, and when there are no 
celebrated strongholds to capture, and no great centers of population to occupy…” 
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required regular military forces “to resort to cattle lifting and village burning.”89  He 
asserts that while these actions might “shock the humanitarian,” they are necessary to win 
against a foe that “cannot be touched by his patriotism or his honour.”90  While this is an 
oversimplification of the British perception of people they were engaging during colonial 
expansion, the assumption for Callwell and many in the British ranks was that to “ensure 
lasting peace” in what would be colonial areas, especially the more “semi-civilized” ones, 
the fundamental objective was the “overawing and not the exasperation of the enemy.”91  
In other words, demonstrations of power in varying degrees were necessary, if not 
sufficient, in defeating and controlling “irregulars” and “semi-civilized” people.  Once 
the British had “overawed” those resisting, they were then obligated to help develop new 
“semi-civilized” subjects into civilized ones. 
These assumptions were rooted in the “white man’s burden” concept.  While we 
cannot discuss the concept fully here, basically the “white man’s burden” concept was a 
belief in the inherent superiority of Western civilization over those of the non-Western 
colonies.  According to Mockaitis, within this context, the British tended “to view 
colonials as children…”92  Mockaitis also contends that, in general, the British believed 
that colonial subjects “were far more concerned with bread and butter issues than they 
were with political freedoms, which they had not enjoyed prior to British rule anyway.”93  
Any semblance of political unrest could be muted by “improving the native standard of 
living” and “[d]isturbances had to be quelled just as schoolboys had to be disciplined.”94 
As this indicates, British policy was partly rooted in an objectification of “semi-civilized” 
colonial subjects to essential groups of people desiring the basics (food, shelter, peace) 
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with little desire for political development beyond that which gave them these basics.  
While our description of the role of the “white man’s burden” as a theoretical influence 
on Britain’s policies oversimplifies the matter, it was an undeniable part of the British 
schema during the colonial expansion and the Mandate periods.  As we will see, this 
schema would adversely affect British policies and decisions, particularly during the 
management of the Iraqi Mandate.  By the end of the 19th century, many of the “savages” 
or “semi-civilized races” were no longer resisting British forces on the external fringes of 
the empire where a “small wars” approach to these issues was generally employed with 
little British consternation.  At the dawn of the 20th century, through conquest, many of 
the “savages” became British imperial subjects who would have to be policed in 
instances of unrest.  Thus, there was an implied and practical need for the conceptual 
adjustment in British doctrine and force application which would mostly involve British 
subjects.  
In his book Britain’s Civil Wars Charles Townshend echoes Mockaitis’ assertion 
regarding the British drive for a conceptual modification to the model of these conflicts.  
Townshend also adds an important assertion about the implication of the change for the 
British:  
[o]ne small but clear signpost of change in the twentieth century has been the 
growing use of the word ‘peacekeeping’ in place of ‘pacification’.  The 
change implied not only that the process of pacifying turbulent and 
uncivilized peoples had been brought to a successful end, but also that the old 
dynamic of self confidence had given way to a more tentative attitude.95   
 
Although Townshend is referring to this “small but clear signpost” as a more contemporary 
event, the conceptual change started in the early 20th century.  As he noted, one implication 
of this change was “a more tentative attitude” when dealing with unrest.  Townshend asserts 
that the “tentative attitude” was based on an inherent restraint against force built into British 
common and statutory law.  According to Townshend, this “dominant minimalist doctrine,” 
or “principle of ‘necessary force’,” restricted the legal right of an official to use force in the 
restoration of order to that which was “no more and no less than absolutely necessary to 
                                                 
95 Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars : Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century, 16. 
38 
 
restore peace.”96  This was a problematic concept for many British military commanders.  
In fact, Townshend maintains that “[a]s a formula for practical action this doctrine was 
transparently unworkable by the eighteenth century.”97  As a response to this issue, the 
British passed “Acts of Indemnity” to relieve military and police officers from the burden 
of recriminations for inadequate or excessive force in attempting to restore order.  
Regardless of “Acts of Indemnity,” British officials operated within a legal framework in 
the context of internal disturbances that made force an option requiring significant 
calculations by those intending to use it.  Townshend asserts that despite the problematic 
nature of the necessary force principle it governed the whole spectrum of internal 
security action, from military aid to the civil power through martial law.”98   
While it is true that the necessary force principle guided British actions in their 
colonial territories, history is replete with examples of their application of extreme force 
when fighting insurgencies during the early 20th century.  In his book British 
Counterinsurgency, John Newsinger asserts that the essence of “Imperial Policing” was 
the employment of “[o]verwhelming force” such as “mobile columns and punitive 
expeditions marauding through rebel territory” against “insurgents, who would be 
battered into submission and taught a healthy respect for British power.”99  However, it is 
more accurate that tactics like these, which the British did employ, illustrate the 
previously-mentioned, conflicted nature of British COIN as it was evolving from the 
“small wars” approach to “imperial policing” and finally into the mature British COIN 
process.  The British military was populated with officers with a “small wars” schema 
who had conducted operations against “irregulars” during the late 19th century and the 
early 20th century.  These men had to reconcile the perceived effectiveness of 
demonstrated British power as means to “overawe” insurgents into quiescence with the 
more sophisticated COIN principles Mockaitis discussed in his book.  In fact, the major 
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tenants of “imperial policing” were rooted in the necessary force principle because, in the 
cases of internal uprisings, “[t]he military object is to restore civil government, and no 
measures should be taken which would inflict needless indignities on the civil population, 
or lead to subsequent bitterness.”100  Although this quote is from a 1947 manual on 
Internal Security Duties, it illustrates Mockaitis’ and Townsend’s assertions that, at the 
dawn of the 20th century, the British understood the differences between the “small war” 
and matters of “imperial policing.”  A more accurate description of “imperial policing” 
would be a strategy in which, as Mockaitis claims, the British grasped the essential 
“importance of civil-military co-operation” to divide insurgents from the civilian 
population and use tactics to support this strategy.  However, in practice they often 
resorted to “punitive measures” rooted in the “small wars” philosophy, such as the 
destruction of villages in Iraq during the 1920 rebellion, to “cow the people or break the 
grip of terrorism.”101  In fact, “imperial policing” was a transitional strategy that 
incorporated effective COIN tactics rooted in the notions of population control and civil-
military cooperation, without “the political reform” process, with the extremely violent 
“small wars” practices.102  Again, to assert a dichotomy between these strategies is 
problematic.  The crucial point is that the British were operating in this conflicted 
doctrinal context during the Iraqi and Zionist rebellions.  
C. THE FIRST BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN IN IRAQ: 
“SMALL WAR” MEETS “IMPERIAL POLICING” 
In this section we analyze the British COIN campaign in Iraq during the 1920 
rebellion.  The rebellion pushed the strategic, operational, and tactical limits of the British 
and, on several occasions, they were handily defeated by rebels who employed mobile 
raiding tactics to isolate and attack the them.  As we will discuss, the Iraqi rebellion was a 
catalyst for change in British COIN and solidification of their political policy in Iraq.  
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The political outcome of the revolt was the unchallenged policy exclusion of the Shi’i 
and Kurds from Iraqi government institutions by “reverting to the Turkish practice of 
letting the Sunni Arab minority of Iraq rule the rest of the population.”103 The rebellion 
was also a catalytic event that shaped British political policies and COIN practices in the 
Middle East for decades.  The British objective was stability in Iraq that was conducive to 
British political objectives, cost-effective and designed for marginal political 
development of the country.  As the section on British policies leading to the rebellion 
indicates, the instability that exploded into large-scale war was mostly caused by British 
actions designed to achieve stability in Iraq from 1914 to 1920 which is exemplified by 
the actions of British political officers.  These men are illustrative of the British efforts to 
employ soft power to influence local leaders and implement modified imperial policies.  
Additionally, they exemplify the conflicted nature of British policy in Iraq between those 
who favored an approach that allowed for Iraqi self determination and those who 
believed in and supported policies and strategies that were designed to expediently ensure 
British influence in Iraq and the region.  These policies and the political officers shaping 
and enforcing them ultimately caused instability and contributed to the outbreak of the 
rebellion.  Similarly, as the section on British tactics and policies during the rebellion 
shows, the political expediencies and the success of harsh “small wars” tactics in putting 
down the rebellion resulted in a sustained instability in Iraq that would boil over in 
revolutions, coups, and wars throughout the 20th century.  
How did the British end up in such a threatened position in Iraq in 1920?  Much 
of their predicament was the result of the evolutionary process of British COIN from the 
“small wars” approach to the “imperial policing” concept within the developing 
international pressures for self determination of developing states and a limited budget.  
As previously discussed, this resulted in conflicted policies at high levels and the 
employment of many contradictory and kinetic tactics in the Iraqi theater.    While some 
of these approaches fall firmly in the best practices of COIN and are reflected in FM 3-
24’s LLOs, others are traditional or modified “small wars” tactics centered on 
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technology.  Whatever progress the British made in leveraging soft power through 
political officers as a part of their COIN approach in Iraq was offset by their 
contradictory and expedient political, civil and military policies.  Ultimately, British 
tactics prior to the rebellion were powerful causal variables that decisively contributed to 
insurgency and full rebellion.   
1. Background: The 1920 Rebellion: A Brief Summary 
By most accounts the actual large-scale rebellion in Iraq against the British started 
in June of 1920.104  According to Vinogradov, “the first shot signaling the revolt was 
fired on 30 June 1920 at Ramaytha in the Diwaniya province” when elements of the 
Zawalim tribe attacked a British stockade holding their shaykh, freed him and “declared 
rebellion” against the British.  Lightly-manned British garrisons in several locations 
along the mid-Euphrates were isolated and attacked by “tribal warriors”105  Whether the 
attacks at Ramaytha constituted the “first shot” of the rebellion or the seizure of Tel Afar 
on 4 June marks its start, by mid-July much of the mid-Euphrates had been rapidly seized 
or isolated by various tribes and, according to Tripp, this “gave heart to others and the 
rebellion spread to the tribes of the lower Euphrates, as well as to districts south, east and 
west of Baghdad.”106  As these events unfolded, Kurdish chiefs in southern Kurdistan 
rebelled as well and took the opportunity to seize villages on the Iranian border. Over the 
course of about five months the British and various Iraqi groups were engaged in large-
scale open combat on several occasions.  The rebels continued to raid vulnerable British 
positions, assassinate and kidnap British officials, and sabotage lines of communication 
during the rebellion.  But the coordination, size and tenacity of the attacks were in stark 
contrast to the infrequent and opportunistic raiding conducted by tribal and “Sharifian” 
elements in the two years preceding the rebellion.  
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Perhaps the most noted of these examples is that of the Manchester Regiment.  
One July 23rd, a “small mixed column of four infantry companies and two Indian cavalry 
squadrons” was dispatched to set the conditions for the relief of “a small body of British 
civilians, troops, and levies” besieged in Kufa.107  In the spirit of demonstrating British 
power and resolve to the “natives,” the column, like many others, would show the flag as 
well as tactically position itself to support the relief of Kufa.  In fact, Jacobsen contends 
that the Manchesters constituted the bulk of the British mobile reserve in theater at the 
time.  In the late morning, “in the full heat of mid-summer Iraq (120F) and without 
adequate supplies of water,” the column moved six miles south of Hilla to Imam Bakr.108  
When the column halted for the evening, its reconnaissance elements discovered “several 
thousand Arabs advancing on the camp from the north.” Cut off from Hilla and 
surrounded, the Manchester’s commander R.N. Hardcastle attempted to withdraw to 
Hilla to prevent the Arabs from seizing the town.  Taking advantage of the dark and the 
general confusion associated with moving any large and exhausted military element at 
night, the “Arabs” attacked.  According to Jacobsen, “only the tenacity of the Indian 
cavalry saved the column” from complete destruction at the hands of Arab tribesmen.109  
In the end, the Manchesters suffered 380 casualties with 20 confirmed dead and 360 
wounded or missing.  
Ultimately the Manchester disaster exposed several key issues to which the 
British were forced to adapt:  it exposed the immobility and insufficient numbers of the 
British forces; the desperate fight of this exhausted column also showed the tactical 
insufficiency of the British in light of the rapidly developing and decentralized rebellion; 
finally, as a single event in a series of tactical set backs, the Manchester disaster showed 
British leaders in Iraq, India and London that they could, or would, lose Iraq unless they 
adapted to the situation on the ground.  In fact, the British did adapt.  Mostly in response 
to Manchester incident, the British General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Iraq, Sir 
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Aylmer L. Haldane, reluctantly changed his opinion of rebel capabilities and the forces 
he would need to put down the rebellion.  He began to push hard for additional troops, 
cabling the request to the war office on 25 July.110  According to Jacobsen, by October 
Haldane was reinforced with 4,883 British and 24,508 Indian troops in addition to the 
80,000 he commanded in June 1920.111  In reality Jacobsen contends that Haldane could 
actually only maneuver about 53,000 men (“2,400 British and 45,000 Indian 
effectives…and 5,000 Iraqi levies) when the rebellion erupted in June.112  Regardless, 
with these additional troops (many of whom were inexperienced and poorly-armed 
Indians) and employing modernized “small war” tactics such as aerial raiding, the British 
finally projected enough power to end open revolt in October.   
During the course of the rebellion, the rebels cut multiple lines of communication 
including all but one railway leading into Baghdad.  At different times, they isolated or 
seized Tel Afar, Kufa, Diwaniya, and Samawa as well as other significant locations.  
Shi’i leaders in Najaf declared “rebellion” and “the town proceeded to set up a 
Provisional Revolutionary Government…”113  Tens of thousands of Arabs and Kurds 
fought the British in both coordinated and opportunistic battles ranging from small raids 
to capture booty, offensive operations to seize land, and prepared defenses to retain 
control of territory.  Toby Dodge maintains that the British faced “an estimated 131,000 
men across Iraq” during the height of the rebellion.114  By most accounts, between 
15,000 and 20,000 of these rebels were armed with modern rifles.  According to 
Jacobsen, British causalities were relatively light: 426 killed, 1,288 wounded, and 615 
missing.115  Jacobsen puts the British estimate of insurgent casualties at 8,450.116    
                                                 
110 Mark Jacobsen, "'Only by the Sword': British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920," Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 2, no. 2 (1991), 341. 
111 Ibid., 326. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Vinogradov, The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics, 136. 
114  Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq : The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), 135. 
115  Jacobsen, 'Only by the Sword': British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920, 357. 
116  Ibid. 
44 
 
Yet, as the rebellion rapidly and decisively developed in mid-June of 1920, 
considerable elements of the British command structure in Iraq and abroad considered the 
various agitated, indigenous parties unwilling and incapable of conducting effective and 
coordinated operations despite mounting evidence to contrary.  General Haldane and 
Winston Churchill were chief among this group.  However, less than a month later and 
following the Manchester disaster, Haldane was calling for reserves and rapidly adjusting 
his force’s dispositions and tactics.  In the next two sections we analyze key tactics the 
British employed prior to the rebellion and during its height.         
2. The Path to Rebellion in Iraq: Hearts, Minds and the Political Officer 
In this section we see how the British attempted to employ political officers as a 
means of soft power with the intent of shaping Iraqi institutions into elements of a state 
structure that was ultimately intended to maintain stability, facilitate British interests and 
placate calls for self determination in the international community.  The British political 
officers were key instruments of the British strategy both prior to and after the rebellion.  
However, it is their actions prior to the rebellion that contributed to instability in the 
country they were attempting to prevent.  In addition, their proclamations and actions are 
indicative of the conflicted evolution of British COIN doctrine and political policy in 
Iraq.  As this section will illustrate, much of the debate between and actions of the British 
political officers attempting to craft acceptable policies in Iraq were instrumental in the 
instability that still plagues Iraq today.  In addition, the conflicted nature of the British 
COIN strategy in which the political officers were such an important part demonstrates 
the necessity of political strategies in COIN and also the danger of political exclusion.   
On November 6, 1914 the British Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force (MEF) 
landed on the Fao peninsula with the intent of pushing the Ottoman army out of the 
territory known as the Basra Valliyet. According to Amal Vinogradov, Sir Percy Cox, a 
political officer and future British Civil Commissioner of Iraq, “immediately proceeded 
to issue a proclamation to the effect that the British were not at war with ‘Arab 
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inhabitants of the river banks’ so long as they did not fight them first.”117  Over the next 
four years, the British fought a difficult campaign to dislodge the Ottomans from the rest 
of Mesopotamia, gain Arab and Kurdish support in the process, and formulate an 
occupation policy that was bounded by competing COIN concepts, economic restrictions 
and maturing international notions of political self determination for developing states.  
As Charles Tripp notes, “it was not until the late summer of 1918 that they [the British] 
occupied Kirkuk and effectively destroyed the Ottoman 6th Army.”118  During this 
period, the British were politically and militarily countering diverse Iraqi insurgent 
elements while conducting a full-scale military campaign against the Ottomans.   In fact, 
Vinogradov asserts that, through men like Percy Cox, the British attempted to depict 
themselves “not as conquerors but [as] liberators” in Iraq.119   
In the context of conventional and COIN campaigns, proclamations made by 
invading forces depicting themselves as liberators of the local population from the yoke 
of an occupying power or insurgent force are common and necessary for many reasons.  
Primary among these is the strategic goal of every invading force to either gain the 
support or neutrality of the local population when fighting these campaigns.  This is 
commonly known today as the Hearts and Minds (HAM) strategy in COIN.120 
Throughout the British Mandate period in Iraq, it is clear that elements of the British 
command structure and policy makers understood and tried to employ elements of this 
strategy.  For example, “in the summer of 1919 when three young British captains 
[political officers] were murdered in Kurdistan” by local Kurds, “an experienced official” 
was sent to replace them.  He was killed in November as well.121  While the 
circumstances of these killings are far from clear, they illustrate the commitment of the 
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British to the HAM effort and the dangerously complex environment in which their 
political officers were operating.  Political officers functioned outside of the military 
realm as “advisors” and administrators of colonial governments.  Moreover though, they 
were key implementers and facilitators of imperial strategy.  Based on the priority the 
British put into manning these billets, it is clear that they understood the pivotal role a 
political officer could play.   
This was particularly true in Iraq.  According to Jacobsen, “most regiments [in 
Iraq] had only seven officers compared with the peacetime 12, since many had been 
detailed to civil administration.”122  Prior to the rebellion, political officers were 
distributed with small garrisons throughout the Valliyets that would become Iraq.  In 
order “to support the nascent civil administration,” A.T. Wilson (the British Civil 
Commissioner in Iraq from 1918 to 1920) had convinced Haldane’s predecessors that 
British forces “had to establish a presence in as many towns as possible.”123  In terms of 
COIN, this strategy of dispersing forces into strategic locations in order to separate the 
population from the insurgents and establish the control and legitimacy of state forces is 
among the most important measures.  Indeed, it is echoed in the LLOs of FM 3-24 today.  
In the case of the British however, two crucial issues stand out: first, as we will see, the 
political officers were mostly shepherding the development of an extractive and 
exclusionary state apparatus that eroded state legitimacy rather than bolstering it; second, 
because these isolated outposts lacked a crucial supportive relationship with local levies 
and a constabulary, they were weak, vulnerable symbols of imperialism, and in most 
cases, targets.  Therefore, as the rebellion spread in 1920, these garrisons and their 
political officers were isolated, captured, or killed such as in Tel Afar where the entire 
British garrison was killed by tribesmen and Iraqi levies who also rebelled.   This was 
obviously problematic for Haldane as he attempted to reestablish order in Iraq.   
Cox’s 1914 proclamation illustrates an additional important issue in the scope of 
the British occupation of Iraq and COIN: it marks the beginning of a conflicted and 
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contrary British political and military policy in Iraq.  The conceptual struggle to reconcile 
“small wars” doctrine and emerging “imperial policing” tactics within the effort to 
establish sustained British control in Iraq is clearly illustrated by the changing 
proclamations and actions of political officers prior to and after the rebellion.  Arguably, 
British political officers’ actions between 1917 and 1920 to create a state that would 
support British regional aspirations while ostensibly accommodating the spirit of self 
determination was a key causal variable leading to the 1920 rebellion.  While it is 
important to acknowledge that the Mandate policies alone were crucial sources of 
discontent.  The political officers’ interpretations and manipulations of these policies 
grounded in their personal biases, the manner in which they implemented directives and 
influenced British policies were catalysts providing a local focus for agitation and 
mobilization among various groups such as the Shi’i ulama and Sharifian loyalists.  
These policies and the political officers’ roles in developing and implementing them may 
not have been sufficient for rebellion in Iraq, but they developed the key conditions of 
political exclusion, frustration and expected foreign political domination which was 
necessary for rebellion.       
As the MEF fought the Ottomans and attempted to consolidate British gains, Arab 
responses to the British policies and campaign in Iraq were mixed at best.  According to 
Tripp, “[t]he inhabitants of the three provinces [Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra] reacted in a 
variety of ways to the events which engulfed them.”124  We can see early evidence of 
nationalist and religiously-based sentiments within segments of the Iraqi population as 
they resisted both Ottoman and British forces depending on the circumstances.  Large 
sections of the Iraqi population were quick to attack the Ottomans or desert their ranks as 
the Ottomans’ power in the region began to wane.  According to Tripp  
[l]arge numbers of tribesmen did join the Ottoman forces as auxiliaries, 
but many deserted after the defeat at Shu’aiba, sometimes turning on their 
erstwhile allies.  In Najaf and Karbala in the months following Shu’aiba, 
uprisings against the Ottoman authorities broke out.  These uprisings were 
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anti-Ottoman in a broad sense, often sparked by particular local 
resentments, but they were not in support of the British war effort.125  
  
P.W. Ireland maintains that “[t]he pre-war Nationalist Movement had been occasioned 
less by the evils of the Turkish administration…than by the fact that the Turks, in spite of 
a common religion, were non-Arab rulers and that they barred the way to 
independence…”126  During the six years between the invasion of the MEF in 1914 and 
the Iraqi rebellion in 1920, Ireland maintains that “Arab Nationalism flickered fitfully in 
‘Iraq.”127  Iraqis rebelled against Ottoman control in Najaf, Karbala, Hilla, Kufa and 
Tuwairij.  Based on this, it would appear that many Iraqis were eager to eject the 
Ottomans, but they were not interested in trading Ottoman control for British occupation.  
As this illustrates, the 1920 rebellion did not happen in a vacuum.  Indeed, it was the 
series of increasingly confused policies formulated, resisted and articulated by the 
political officers on many occasions that solidified Iraqi resistance to the British. 
On March 11, 1917 the MEF, under command of General Maude, seized 
Baghdad.  On this occasion, a statement was issued in his name to the people of Baghdad.  
Among other claims, it asserted that British were “liberators” and not “conquerors.”  But 
most importantly to many Iraqis regardless of their ethnicity or sect, it proclaimed that 
the people of Baghdad,…are not to understand that it is the wish of the 
British Government to impose upon you alien institutions.  It is the hope 
of the British Government that the aspirations of your philosophers and 
writers shall be realized again…O! People of Baghdad…I am commanded 
to invite you, through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives to 
participate in the management of your civil affairs in collaboration with 
the Political representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British 
Army so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the North, East, South 
and West in realizing the aspirations of your races.128 
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This proclamation was actually “a story of irony” according to Ghassan R. 
Atiyyah.129  Written by Sir Mark Sykes who was the noted co-author of the Sykes-Pico 
Agreement of 1916 which secretly divided portions of the Middle East between Britain 
and France, the 11 March Baghdad proclamation clearly signified British support of Iraqi 
political development.  However, General Maude and Percy Cox both opposed its 
publication.  As well, there was little support for the declaration from A.T. Wilson.  
According to Atiyyah, Wilson called it a “piece of ‘politics’… designed for local 
consumption.”130  Maude, Cox and Wilson all favored statements and policies grounded 
in direct British control and Arab cooperation.  Indeed, in a draft proclamation he wrote 
to the residents of Baghdad on March 8, Cox stated that for the Iraqis “to ensure their 
own emancipation” they should continue “going quietly about their daily vocations and 
assisting the British authorities to carry on normal administration.”131  The different 
visions for Iraq’s future articulated in the 1917 Sykes and Cox proclamations illustrates 
two important points.  First, the Sykes proclamation was rooted in the ideas of Arab 
independence that were articulated in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the 1918 
British and French “joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to self-rule by the 
indigenous populations of Mesopotamian and Syria,” and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points.  These all encouraged regional and Iraqi expectations of tangible British policies 
supporting self determination and Iraqi political development which is consistent with the 
HAM strategy.  Second, it shows the internal divisions in the British policy and military 
agencies.  While the details of this are far too complex to sufficiently discuss here, there 
were numerous conflicting opinions within the British ranks about their method of 
governance in Iraq and Iraqi independence.  This illustrates the struggle to reconcile the 
“white man’s burden” and “small wars” mentality with the appreciation for the soft 
power partially included in the “imperial policing” approach.      
It was during these years that the British struggled to formulate a policy in Iraq 
that would reconcile their political objectives, the ideals of self-determination propagated 
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by Wilsonian doctrine, strong Iraqi independence sentiments, and the conceptual 
evolution of British COIN discussed previously.  These policies were not only designed 
to secure British interests in Iraq and influence in the Middle East, they amounted to 
COIN strategy as well.  In effect, the British attempted to create an Iraqi state structure 
using political officers and other tactics that would counter elements the British 
considered threatening to their objectives in the region.  According to Charles Tripp, in 
the case of Iraq, the British “needed and found subjects to constitute the order which they 
believed best suited the idea of the Mandate and the protection of British interests.”132   
Within this context, the diverse populations of the three “Ottoman provinces of 
Basra, Baghdad and Mosul” were formed into the modern Iraqi state structure as 
designed by the British.  Facilitated by political officers and similar to the Ottomans, the 
British empowered minority groups to govern the newly formed state and politically 
excluded other populations “who aspired to different kinds of order.”133  For example, 
when A.T. Wilson conducted a “plebiscite” in the fall of 1919 to determine sentiments 
among “notables” across Iraq about the constitutional development of Iraq, the answers 
varied.  According to Yitzhak Nakash, even though the desires of many “Arab Shi’i 
merchants, notables, tribal shaykhs, and even some mujtahids for the continuation of 
British rule…” was clear, “important Najafi mujtahids and other figures in the city 
expressed a wish for an independent state extending from Mosul in the north to the 
Persian Gulf in the south.”134  Varied opinions like these in the plebiscite and calls for 
independence presented in a January 1919 petition from “prominent mujtahids, sayyids, 
[and] other religious functionaries in Karbala” were not included in the “group [of 
petitions] sent to London.”135  In the case of the Karbala petition, “the British official in 
charge” refused to accept it because it was tendered after the deadline for submitting 
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“opinions on self-determination.”136  This illustrates the conflicted nature of British 
policy and the impact of the political officer in Iraq.  While it is reasonable to assert that 
the political officers shaping the information going to their higher headquarters were 
acting in what they saw as the best interests of the crown by elevating those Iraqis who 
supported British interests, these officers were also setting the conditions for open 
rebellion by not even ostensibly including potential resistance groups in the political 
process.  This made it clear to independence-minded Iraqis that they could not gain 
anything by operating within the system.  This exclusion was an important causal 
variable setting the conditions for large-scale rebellion.  As it turned out, all that was 
needed was a catalytic event in this environment to push many Iraqis to unite and openly 
fight the British. 
The San Remo agreement of May, 1920 was that event.  It divided much of the 
Middle East into zones of control, or Mandates, between France and Britain.  With 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points extolling “self determination,” British support for 
Arab independence in the form of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence during the First 
World War, and the 1918 British and French “joint declaration reaffirming their 
commitment to self-rule by the indigenous populations of Mesopotamian and Syria,” one 
can only imagine the frustration and mistrust felt by independent-minded Iraqis with the 
announcement of the Mandates.  If it is possible to point to one event that was an external 
catalyst for the 1920 revolt, the San Remo agreement would be it because it was an 
official declaration of British intent to stay in control of Iraq regardless of what the 
Western powers decided to call it.  If this event is considered in conjunction with other 
Iraqi motives such as resentment that was surely felt by Iraqis who “[a]s proof of their 
loyalty to His Majesty’s Government…provided ‘volunteer’ money for such causes as 
the Red Cross, army shelters in England, and the [e]rection of a monument for General 
Maude,” it is easy to see its causal power.137  The San Remo agreement was truly a 
watershed moment in Iraqi-British relations and an easily identifiable rallying point for 
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all Iraqis interested in independence regardless of their motives.  In June these catalysts, 
frustrations and military opportunities developed into full rebellion.  In the next section, 
we will analyze the key British tactical and political response to this and its implications.  
3 Countering the 1920 Rebellion: Hard Power, Soft Power and 
Expedient Stability 
How did the British manage to defeat the Iraqi insurgency without conducting the 
long and costly campaign associated with most COIN efforts?  The very basic answer is 
that they quickly ended open rebellion by employing crushing military technology when 
they needed and could, and co-opted significant elements of Iraqi society to expediently 
establish order.  In June 1920 the British faced a potent military challenge in Iraq:  much 
of the British forces were disbursed in weak, small outposts throughout the Mandate; 
their ability to maneuver, communicate and mutually support each other was severely 
restricted by terrain, weather, logistics and the enemy; they lacked a clear picture of the 
enemy situation; and the British chain of command from the highest to the lowest levels 
was far from unified.  However, in the course of five months the British regained control 
of Iraq and soundly defeated the rebellion.  The British returned to the one strategy they 
knew would establish order: punitive strikes and sweeps.  As we discuss below, order 
was ultimately the objective because all other progress was contingent upon its 
establishment. We will discuss some of these tactics and their implications in more detail 
below.  Before moving on to this discussion however, it is important to once again 
emphasize that the British military campaign to end the 1920 rebellion solved the 
immediate tactical and operational issues for the British, but history has demonstrated the 
inadequacies of the British solutions in Iraq.  Jacobsen also makes this important and 
accurate point:  
[a]t its most fundamental, the Arab revolt taught that Iraq could not be 
held as a dependent state.  For financial as well as strategic reasons, there 
was no alternative to the mandate and to hoping that rule by ‘moderates’ 







power to Feisal and the Sherifans, weakening the power of the two most 
intractable elements of the Iraqi body politic [Shi’i and Kurdish] at a time 
of political transition.138 
 
While the inclusion of the minority Sunni “sharifian and ex-Ottoman 
administrative elites” and exclusion of others, such as the “Shi’i mujtahids” and “Kurdish 
leaders,” from the state institutions may have seemed an expedient policy guaranteeing 
British interests, it reinforced the Sunni minority’s “authoritarian inclinations...[and] was 
not a promising basis for the national integration that was in theory intended to 
accompany the construction of the modern state.”139  In fact, the problematic lessons the 
British took from the 1920 COIN campaign in Iraq (modernized “small wars” tactics and 
rule through political exclusion of uncooperative elements) were foundational elements 
of their COIN efforts in the region for decades.  Their fundamental assumption based on 
their experiences in Iraq was that updated versions of “small wars” tactics were effective 
and decisive in achieving their primary objective: oder.   
In the British schema, order mostly equated to stability and nascent public 
support.  Townshend maintains that “the consistent aim of British counterinsurgency 
action has been the ‘restoration of law and order’.  Whilst soldiers sometimes take a 
rather formalistic view of order-as the mere absence of disturbance-civil administrators 
see it as the embodiment of the spirit of consensus, a positive endorsement of the political 
system.”140  This colonial “small wars” philosophy was only reinforced by the rapid 
defeat of the rebellion. Ultimately, according to Jacobsen, the  
British conduct of operations looked backwards to the Boer War and to 
Indian frontier wars.  General Callwell’s Small Wars, the summa of 
nineteenth century British counterinsurgency, illuminates Haldane’s 
conduct of operations at every turn.141 
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General Haldane, a veteran of World War I and the Boer War, used his experiences, 
leadership capabilities, and technological advantages to adapt to the situation and retake 
the initiative in Iraq.  In a combination of conventional warfare and “small wars” 
stratagies and new technology, he consolidated his available forces into strike elements, 
secured lines of communications and key locations, and attacked the enemy when and 
where he could.  Below we analyze the key COIN tactic the British employed in Iraq 
during and following the rebellion, the punitive strike an sweep 
a. Punitive Strike and Sweep  
As discussed earlier, many British military and political leaders placed a 
lot of stock in the concept of demonstrated power and punishment when dealing with 
“semi-civilized” populations.  Rooted in the “small wars” philosophy, punitive strikes 
and sweeps operationalized the “idea that a ‘short, sharp shock’, an exemplary 
application of force, will permit a quicker return to normality…” when fighting a COIN 
campaign.142 Although there were acknowledged limitations to their effectiveness and 
questions about the morality of punishing “semi-civilized” people into acquiescence, 
punitive strikes and sweeps were a fundamental element of British COIN doctrine and 
these tactics were main stays of British COIN for decades.  In fact, their perceived 
efficacy was arguably the primary COIN lesson the British garnered from their campaign 
in Iraq.  As we will see, they carried this flawed lesson to its logical conclusion by 
attempting to improve their punitive strike effectiveness through technology and build 
their COIN strategy around punitive strikes and sweeps.  In the end, the British believed 
that the restoration of order they achieved in Iraq validated punitive strikes and sweeps as 
one of the primary means of achieving victory in COIN.  As the historical record 
indicates, this was flawed thinking.    
Because of their kinetic nature, punitive strikes and sweeps evolved with 
technology.  Prior to World War I, they were characterized by the slow-moving punitive 
columns of infantry and mounted cavalry troops sweeping into villages, burning homes, 
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destroying or confiscating livestock, and in the case of Iraq, levying fines.  For example, 
once General Haldane received his reinforcements in Iraq and consolidated his units into 
strike forces, he deployed “as many as 12 simultaneous separate columns…throughout 
Iraq to collect fines.”  According to Jacobsen, “[o]ne regimental history’s account of a 
punitive sweep north of Hilla in late October counts 800 prisoners and 7,000 head of 
cattle, sheep, and horses as the take.”143  As this indicates punitive strikes were often part 
of larger sweeps designed to drive insurgent forces out of territories that the British 
would then occupy, or as in the “sweep north of Hilla,” the columns punished the 
population for supporting the insurgents and withdrew from the area to a larger base in 
true punitive strike fashion.   
These tactics were effective means of projecting power and temporarily 
seizing the initiative from insurgents by denying them logistical support and sanctuary in 
areas.  When they were employed in conjunction with the British political strategy of 
emplacing and elevating proxies, punitive strikes and sweeps were effective as a means 
of controlling the population.  According to Toby Dodge, “[i]n the case of state-society 
relations under the Mandate, it was the state’s ability to deploy violence simultaneously 
with the influence given to it by the exercise of largesse that defined the nature of its 
relations with the Iraqi population.”144  While this coercive combination of hard and soft 
power was hardly a recipe for extended stability, it was definitely a means for quickly 
establishing control of areas.  As long as the elite, a shaykh in most cases, could muster 
enough physical support within his tribal structure and the British were capable of 
delivering lethal punitive strike support for him as well, areas were controlled.   
However, as part of the punitive strike and sweep tactic, the punitive 
column did have its disadvantages.  As the Manchester disaster demonstrated, infantry 
and horse-mounted cavalry columns were vulnerable to weather, terrain, and a mobile 
enemy who was familiar with the land.  The punitive columns were slow and their range 
was severely restricted by their logistical support requirements.  This was particularly 
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true in the case of Iraq.  The British looked to the technological innovations of World 
War I as part of the answer to this problem.  In particular, they relied on machine-gun 
equipped cavalry, armored cars, and the airplane. 
According to Jacobsen, when employed with the right weapons, “cavalry’s 
effectiveness in 1920 Iraq demonstrated anew that cavalry was a weapon with a future as 
well as a past.”145  What Jacobsen means is that when the cavalry troops were equipped 
with light machine guns, this added fire power to their mobility which allowed them to 
dominate the equally mobile, but outgunned insurgents.  Indeed, the speed and fire power 
of the cavalry were interpreted as the key to defeating highly mobile insurgents.  In the 
minds of many British tacticians, mobility was the decisive capability in COIN.  The 
British forces’ ability to focus their superior combat power at decisive points was 
contingent on their ability to match the speed of the insurgents.  The more mobile the 
force, the more capable it was of defeating the insurgents whenever they would “pop up.”  
As we will discuss, the “successes” of the increasingly mobile and lethal capabilities 
developed and employed by the British in Iraq were seen as the validation of the 
kinetically-grounded military planners’ and politicians’ beliefs in these as a sort of cost-
effective tactical panacea for British imperial woes in the early and mid 20th century.    
It is important to understand that this faith in technology combined with 
mobility and massed combat power was not unanimous among British military leaders.  
As Mockaitis notes, while developing, implementing, and experiencing perceived success 
with these methods in Iraq, the British were employing “small-unit operations...” as ‘a 
matter of official strategy” in Northern Ireland by April 1921 because large-scale 
motorized and mounted sweeps were relatively ineffective against the rebels there.  With 
good intelligence and stealth, British forces were able to “beat the IRA at its own 
game.”146  In the case of Northern Ireland, British military leaders were coming to 
understand the importance of intelligence in conjunction with mobility.  Nonetheless, in  
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Iraq mobility and fire power seemed to be sufficient to win militarily in a COIN 
campaign and this belief characterized much of British strategy in the Middle East for 
decades. 
Building on the advantages of light machine guns and cavalry, the British 
employed two more very important technological innovations in their COIN campaign in 
Iraq: the armored car and airplane.  Of the two, the airplane was truly seen as the pinnacle 
of efficiency and effectiveness in terms of mobility and force projection.  While armored 
cars offered added protection from small arms, faster movement, and greater range for 
infantry soldiers, “their drawbacks, liability to break down or to be ambushed, were not 
forgotten, and their promise was heavily qualified.”147  Despite their disadvantages, 
armored cars were rapidly integrated into the British arsenal and they were employed in 
mostly a supportive role by them.  In reality, they never materialized into the advanced, 
mobile fighting platforms for countering insurgents’ mobility that many military planners 
hoped they would. 
However, several British political and military leaders, including Churchill 
and Haldane, saw the airplane as the ultimate force projection platform and an effective 
population control tool in the COIN environment.  When the airplane is considered in the 
context of the conceptual evolution of British COIN doctrine, its employment in Iraq 
marks a decisive turn toward favoring lethal, inexpensive stand-off weapon systems as a 
means of achieving tactical and operational dominance in support of British policies.  
According to Jacobsen, the actual effectiveness of the airplane in Iraq was “modest, 
consisting of reconnaissance, presence, and something resembling close air support, none 
of which demonstrated that air power could substitute for ground forces in holding restive 
natives at bay.”148  Dodge also makes this assertion: “[u]ntil October 1922 air power was 
not the main coercive tool used to enforce order across Iraq.  It acted as a useful and 
novel ancillary tool used to enforce order across Iraq.”149   
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But, the airplane’s tactical capabilities and successes in Iraq were not the 
most important factors to consider in the scope of British COIN.  The notion that air 
power, as a part of the punitive strike tactic, could be substituted for the punitive column 
was entrenched in British thinking less than two years after its introduction into the Iraqi 
theater of operations.  Toby Dodge maintains that, for the British, there were three 
“dominant themes” that emerged from the introduction of the air power into COIN in 
Iraq:  
[f]irst, efficiency: it could get to places troops could not or should not go.  
Secondly, knowledge: the maps planes provided confirmed and 
consolidated the dominant understanding of rural Iraq.  Third, 
triumphalism: the destructive force of the new weapon was widely 
celebrated as a vindicating testament to western superiority over the 
world’s backward peoples.150 
 
Based on the fact that the Royal Air Force (RAF) was given responsibility for “military 
order” in Iraq in October of 1922, it appears that the highest levels of British leadership 
believed in air power as the answer to the difficulty of managing disparate threats in Iraq 
from non-compliant villages to swarms of tribal warriors.  
Eventually the Mandates were supposed to develop into independent 
states.  Considering the very public British support for this policy and their shrinking 
defense budget following World War I, the airplane was an ideal way of projecting 
British power in support of the weak Iraqi government and the tribal shaykhs who were 
supposed to keep order in Iraq.  In his book Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation 
Building and a History Denied, Toby Dodge maintains that air power was firmly 
entrenched  “as the state’s main weapon of coercion” in Iraq by 1923.  While this is an 
important and accurate point, he also makes another vital assertion in terms of 
understanding the effects of British military and political policies that shaped the Iraqi 
state in which the airplane was the final arbitrator.  The expediency of the airplane was 
matched with the perceived practicality of using the “nominal shaikh[s]” in previously 
uncontrolled areas as the mediators between the state and the populations they 
theoretically lead in these troubling regions.  According to Dodge, many of these shaykhs 
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were in reality weak and ineffectual.  But, in the two years following the rebellion the 
British transformed Iraqi society by surveying and sectioning off these regions.  The 
British restructured them into what they perceived as the “authentic social structures” that 
was disrupted under the Ottomans.151  However, Dodge maintains that British 
perceptions of Iraqi social and tribal structures in the rural areas in which the “nominal 
shaikh” was the classical community leader were often contrary to the reality on the 
ground.  Therefore, when the British demanded the shaykhs from the al Sufran and 
Barakat tribes collect a penalty tax from their tribal villages for the “frequent raiding” in 
areas believed to be under their control, both shaykhs failed to deliver any money 
because they could not .  In fact, “Khahan al Jazi, the nominal shaikh of the Barakat” 
informed the “Administrative Inspector” that he would need “police support to maintain 
his own village.”152  
While this is only a single example of this, Dodge presents several in his 
book.  The key point for our purposes is that the British rapidly abandoned their oversight 
of Iraq to proxies and applied a modernized punitive strike tactic as their primary means 
of control there.  There were two important ramifications of their policies: first, as history 
has demonstrated, the political and military expediencies of the British channeled Iraqi 
institutional development along a violent and exclusionary path that was anything but 
stable in the long term; second, British political and military leaders in this period, 
especially Winston Churchill, concluded that order in the Middle East could be achieved 
by technologically advanced hard power combined with convenient support for groups 
whose fortunes were tied to British interests.  Granted, the British employed highly lethal 
“small wars” tactics to defeat the rebellion in Iraq.  However, their perceptions of success 
were grounded in the flawed beliefs in demonstrated power’s ability to cow “natives” 
into submission and the supremacy of rapid mobility and fire power in COIN.   
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It is important to acknowledge that members of the British military, 
British politicians and Iraqis disputed the effectiveness and morality of the expedient 
political and military strategies employed by the British in Iraq.  Dodge sights the 
“damning indictment of the political officer in Amarah in 1920, Major S.E. Hedgecock, 
who challenged “the whole policy of supporting the shaikhs to the exclusion of all other 
sections of society.”153  Townshend quotes “Churchill’s successor [British Secretary of 
State for War], Worthington-Evans” from a 1921 “Cabinet memo” on ‘Policy and 
Finance in Mesopotamia’: 
‘the only weapons which can be used by the Air Force are bombs and 
machine guns’.  These might suffice to repel external attack, but the forces 
in Mesopotamia were ‘intended to keep order and gradually to reconcile 
hostile tribes to a civilized rule’.  For this task ‘the only means at the 
disposal of the Air Force, and the means in fact now used, are the bombing 
of women and children in the villages’…’If the Arab population realize 
that the peaceful control of Mesopotamia ultimately depends on our 
intention of bombing women and children, I am very doubtful if we shall 
gain that acquiescence…154  
 
Regardless of these protests, the British developed and based their rule and COIN 
doctrine on these tactics.  They continued to employ political officers to manage and tutor 
Iraqi officials.  However, they abandoned all practical applications of COIN tactics 
rooted in building rapport with the indigenous populations beyond that which they 
developed with the minority elites who would implement order.  This order was enforced 
by the coercive power of the airplane and later the Iraqi military establishment.  In the 
next section, we will discuss the evolution of these flawed tactics and strategies and their 
implications during the 1945 Zionist revolt in Palestine.  
D. THE ZOINIST REVOLT IN PALESTINE: THE LAST GASPS OF 
BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICING 
In this section we analyze the key COIN tactics employed by the British during 
the Zionist rebellion in Palestine from the end of World War II until their withdrawal 
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from the area in 1948.  Just as in the 1920 Iraqi rebellion, the British employed some 
COIN tactics in Palestine that they would later develop and integrate into a 
comprehensive and effective COIN doctrine.  However, their campaign in Palestine was 
plagued by internal conflicts within the British high command and characterized by a 
combination of ineffective punitive strategies and effective COIN tactics.  These factors 
combined with the increasingly complex internal issues in Palestine and matched by 
building international support for Jewish immigration and statehood ultimately pushed 
the British out.  In 1945, the British had formidable political, military and police forces in 
Palestine, they faced a small insurgency with minimal popular support in the Yishuv 
(Jewish community in Palestine), and they were members of a victorious alliance 
emerging from the largest war in history.  How then, did the British suffer “one of the 
most humiliating episodes in immediate postwar British history” and surrender their 
position in Palestine to the Yishuv in early 1948?   The answer is complex.  But, it can be 
reduced to some vital basic elements.   First, because of internal conflict at the highest 
levels in the British command structure which resulted in shifting policies in Palestine 
and their “imperial policing” doctrine, they ultimately relied on flawed tactics that were 
rooted in the punitive, “small wars” approach to counterinsurgency.  Second, the British 
faced a uniquely problematic situation in Palestine because the prospects for their success 
were severely diminished by the key fact that, by 1947, the Zionists saw no real utility in 
cooperating with the British.  The Yishuv had garnered significant international support 
for Jewish immigration to Palestine and establishment of the Jewish state there.  This 
meant that the British ability to apply economic and political leverage against the Yishuv 
quickly diminished between 1945 and 1947.  Finally, ambiguous policies intended to 
placate both the Yishuv and Palestinians while maintaining British interests in the region 
were ineffective and frustrating to all involved and this created an atmosphere of 
perceived irreconcilability.  Ultimately, these factors combined to make the British 
position in Palestine untenable.  In terms of analyzing the relationship of British COIN 
doctrine and practice during this period to the LLOs in FM 3-24, the implications of the 
British failures in Palestine illustrate the importance of a unified command structure, the 
necessity of clear and attainable objectives, the primacy of intelligence in COIN 
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campaigns, and the relative ineffectiveness of punitive measures.  Finally, the Zionist 
rebellion exemplifies the necessity of a perceived comparative advantage, or utility, 
within the uncommitted population to supporting a state’s COIN campaign.  Without this, 
the state has no real hope of winning. 
1. Background: The British and Zionist Situations in Palestine in 1945   
At the end of World War II the British were broke and battered yet, once again, 
members of a victorious alliance that had defeated the Germans.  Although it was 
considerably diminished, the British Empire was intact and the Union Jack still flew in 
many corners of the world.  The Middle East was one of those areas.  The British 
continued to control Palestine and according to John Newsinger, they “considered 
Palestine to be a territory of vital strategic importance, providing a military base from 
which to dominate the rest to the Middle East.”155  Indeed, just as at the conclusion of 
World War I, the British were again trying to craft a Middle Eastern policy that would 
reconcile their imperial ambitions, regional security concerns, and the mounting and 
more sophisticated pressure for self-determination in the Middle East.  The situation in 
Palestine in 1945 was characterized by an increasingly intense Zionist drive, supported 
by the United States and much of the international community, for a Jewish state in 
Palestine, an indigenous Arab population that, while fractured and plagued by in-fighting, 
was almost unanimously opposed to Jewish immigration and aggravated by international 
support for Zionist expansion in Palestine, and a unanimous frustration shared by British, 
Jews and Arabs with the apparently irreconcilable objectives of the others.   
In this context, Newsinger asserts that Palestine and the rest of the Middle East 
were so important to the British that “in the event of war with the Russians the British… 
planned to defend the Middle East at all costs, according the area a priority second only 
to the defense of the British Isles themselves.”156  The British, although weakened by the 
war, had an impressive array of forces with which they could maintain order in Palestine.  
The British garrison consisted of 100,000 troops in November of 1945.  According to 
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David Charters, of these 100,000 soldiers the British had a total of 29 infantry battalions 
from one infantry and one airborne division that they could effectively deploy and 
maneuver.  In addition “the principal law enforcement and security force in Palestine,” 
the Palestinian police force, had 20,000 “regular and auxiliary personnel during the 1945-
47 period.”157  The police had several “specialized unit[s]” who were equipped and 
trained for different paramilitary operations including a “gendarmerie” that could supply 
the “police with some internal security ‘muscle’ when the British army had few troops to 
spare.”158  In addition, the Political Branch of the Palestine Criminal Investigations 
Department (CID) had approximately 80 policemen dedicated to “counter-insurgency.”  
According to Charters, the Political Branch was separated into the Jewish, Arab and 
European Affairs “desks” and the “Jewish desk” was further divided into the” political 
intelligence, terrorism and illegal immigration sections.”159  In addition, the British 
developed a Public Information Office (PIO) that  
served a dual role: first, public relations, by serving as the link between 
the government and the population; and second, propaganda, to help 
maintain internal security and to promote the war effort.160  
 
Finally, the British had the local sections of their British Security Service (MI5) 
operating throughout the Palestine.   According Bruce Hoffman and most scholars of this 
event, the Zionist resistance elements in Palestine that conducted armed insurgency 
against the British consisted of a “minority of some 4,500 persons, organized within the 
Etzel [the Irgun Zvai Le’umi-the “National Military Organization”] and the Lehi 
[Lohamei Herut Yisrael “Israel Freedom Fighters”].”161  Hoffman asserts that these 
elements “did not enjoy the support of the vast majority of the Yishuv…and were, for 
much of the period, fiercely opposed by the Haganah, the third and largest of the Jewish 
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underground movements.162  It would appear that the British, with a large and capable 
force that was apparently task-organized to deal with the issues in Palestine facing the 
comparatively small and weak insurgent force, should have dealt quickly with the Zionist 
revolt.  Instead, the British were driven out of Palestine three years after World War II.  
In the next section we will discuss some the major issues leading to British defeat and the 
implications for U.S. COIN doctrine.  
a. Key British Coin Strategy and Tactics in Palestine: Punitive 
Strike and Sweep Operations versus Security Operations  
In this section we examine the two overarching strategic and tactical 
categories defining British operations in Palestine during the Zionist rebellion:  punitive 
strike and sweep operations and security operations.  In reality, punitive strike and sweep 
operations are distinguished from security operations by the  sudden deployment of large 
troop formations into areas and their short, intense sweeps through those problematic 
zones.  Just as in the sudden and concentrated punitive strike and sweep operations, 
during security operations the British troops conducted searches and made arrests.  
However, in security operations the British units were deployed into areas and conducted 
sustained actions in which they also secured vital infrastructure. these two categories 
accurately reflect the British approach to COIN in Palestine during the Zionist rebellion 
and the conceptual evolution of British COIN we have been discussing in this Chapter.  
Much like the British COIN campaign in Iraq, the British campaign in Palestine 
illustrates the conflicted nature of their COIN doctrine and the flawed application of force 
in place of potentially more effective tactics..  Before analyzing these two categories in 
detail we must address the reasons for the alternative British strategies in Palestine 
beyond the changes required by the apparent tactical and strategic necessities on the 
ground: namely, the conceptual struggle in the British high command between those 
favoring the “small wars” and ”imperial policing” strategies and those who advocated 
alternative COIN strategies.  It is important to discuss this internal conflict because it also 
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illustrates the conceptual evolution of British CION doctrine during this period and the 
resultant strategic confusion in the British command which produced operational shifts in 
Palestine.  Strategic confusion and operational shifts are the consequential changes in the 
types, sizes and tempo of operations produced by internal debates at highest British 
command levels about the nature and objectives of the conflict in Palestine.  While this is 
an oversimplification of the dynamics effecting the British strategic direction in Palestine 
during the Zionist revolt, much of the strategy there was employed or changed based on 
the conflicts between the British political and military branches in the country.  This 
conflict has several significant implications for our understanding of British COIN 
doctrine and the impact of the Zionist revolt on it.  Primarily, it demonstrates the army’s 
conceptual and institutional inertia in Palestine at the commanding levels that in turn 
negatively effected their tactical COIN operations.  The struggle to reconcile “small 
wars” and “imperial policing” tactics with the military and political complexity of the 
insurgency in Palestine again pushed many British military and political leaders up to and 
beyond their conceptual capabilities.  It also illustrates the significance of command unity 
in COIN which was a lesson the British successfully learned in Malaya.  Again, the 
British were politically and militarily committed to retaining considerable influence in 
Palestine following World War II, they faced a small insurgent group and a Jewish 
population that was initially uncommitted to violent resistance against the British.  Yet, 
the strategic confusion and resulting operational shifts produced by the internal conflicts 
in the British command structure were instrumental in their failure in Palestine.  While 
this factor was certainly not sufficient to cause British defeat in Palestine, it was 
necessary.              
According to David Charters, the British COIN campaign in Palestine can 
be divided into “four distinct phases of operational activity” from 1945 to 1947 based on 
the influences of “strategic policy debates” at the highest military and political levels: 
[f]irst, from October 1945 to the end of June 1946, the security forces 
carried out a peacekeeping role, involving searches and security 
operations.  The second, phase, from 29 June to early September, was 
characterized by a major offensive against the insurgents, including two 
division-sized operations.  The security forces returned to peacekeeping in 
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the third phase, which continued until the end of February 1947. During 
the final phase, from March through August, the security forces went on 
the offensive again, this time employing martial law and special 
operations.163      
 
While others scholars, such as Bruce Hoffman, divide the British occupation and COIN 
campaign at different points in time, they all roughly correspond to the conflicted 
strategic changes and operational shifts mentioned above.164  Discussing each of these 
phases in detail is not in the scope of this thesis.  However, it is important to examine 
dynamic in the British high command in Palestine to understand its impact on the COIN 
campaign there.   
As an illustration of this problematic issue, we will briefly analyze the 
conflicted relationship and actions of the final British High Commissioner of Palestine, 
Sir Alan Cunningham, with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field 
Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery.  Cunningham, a former military officer, and 
Montgomery, the British hero of World War II and veteran of the 1939 Arab revolt in 
Palestine, represent the conceptual and actual divisions with the British command 
structure that produced the dissonant strategies there which was a  major contributing 
factor to British failure.  Again, it is important to acknowledge that Cunningham and 
Montgomery were only part of a very complex conflict involving multiple international, 
regional and domestic variables.  Still, their opinions and conflicts with each other not 
only illustrate the importance of agency in almost any COIN campaign, it also 
exemplifies the near culmination of the British conceptual struggle to define effectively 
COIN and employ truly successful strategies.  In effect, Cunningham typifies the 
realization that politics, intelligence and soft power were the key factors in COIN and 
Montgomery illustrates the British belief in the effectiveness of punitive measures in 
COIN.    
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John Newsinger captures the essence of the conflict between Cunningham 
and Montgomery and the conceptual struggle between those favoring punitive measures 
and those pushing for more comprehensive strategies in Palestine.  In mid 1946, as 
attacks on British soldiers were increasing and becoming more vicious and calls for 
reprisals against the Yishuv were growing louder from the British military command in 
Palestine, General Montgomery became the CIGS.  According to Newsinger, following 
Zionist attacks on the 6TH Airborne Division’s car park in Tel Aviv in which seven 
paratroopers were killed, attacks by the Haganah on “eight of the nine bridges connecting 
Palestine with its neighbors,” and an IZL “kidnapping of five British officers” in Tel 
Aviv, Montgomery “visited the Mandate as part of an overseas tour in June and 
subsequently confesses himself ‘much perturbed by what I heard and saw.’  He thought 
Cunningham completely unsuited to cope with a crisis situation…”165  Newsinger goes 
on to assert that, based on their experiences during the Arab revolt in Palestine in 1939, 
“Montgomery and others believed that repression consistently and relentlessly applied 
could crush the revolt…”166 
According to David Charters, “it was clear that the nature of this counter-
insurgency campaign escaped him [Montgomery]…”167  Additionally, Charters believes 
that Cunningham understood the nature of the Zionist rebellion and its differences with 
the Arab revolt while Montgomery and the other military leaders did not.  This is clear in 
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There is, of course, no comparison between that situation and the present.  
Moreover, I have seen a telegram to CINCMELF to the effect that as a 
soldier he must not be concerned with the politics and must visualize 
matters from a purely military angle.  I need hardly comment on this so far 
as Palestine is concerned.168 
 
Cunningham believed that the path to victory in Palestine was through a combination of 
political and military strategies.  He wanted to “split the Zionist movement in such a way 
as to isolate and neutralize the more extreme elements, thus allowing the moderates to 
regain control.”169  In Cunningham’s estimation this involved measured responses to 
Zionist attacks that would allow the army to disrupt and counter Zionist operations 
without alienating the remainder of the Yishuv which would entice the moderate leaders 
of the Jewish community in Palestine to cooperate with British efforts and provide useful 
intelligence to British forces which would lead to reestablishment of order.  However, as 
we noted above, when it became clear that the United States and the international 
community supported the Jewish efforts in Palestine and the British government was 
unwilling to ease restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Jewish leadership 
no longer motivated to cooperate with the British.  According to Mockaitis, while 
Cunningham was correct about the necessity of political reconciliation for British victory 
in Palestine (establishing stability and security), without concessions on Jewish 
immigration “he could not win over the moderates, and without the winning over the 
moderates he could not obtain the co-operation which would yield the information upon 
which effective counterinsurgency operations could be based.”170  While Montgomery 
believed that offensive operations were the key to winning, Cunningham asserted that 
mass sweeps and arrests without adequate intelligence about the insurgents were 
ineffective and alienated the innocent population.   Although this is a brief analysis of the 
Cunningham-Montgomery rift and its conceptual meaning, it illustrates the conflicts that 
plagued the British command structure in Palestine throughout the insurgency.  This rift 
manifested itself in the strategic confusion and operational shifts described above.  The 
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impacts of these operational shifts were rapid and massive intensifications of punitive 
COIN tactics the British employed in Palestine.  
(1) Punitive Strike and Sweep Tactics and Security Operations 
during the Zionist Revolt.  As we have discussed, punitive operations were rooted in the 
British COIN “small wars” doctrine articulated by Callwell and refined during British 
COIN campaigns in throughout the early 20th century, including the Iraqi rebellion in 
1920.  These tactics were also modified and implemented as an integral part of the 
“imperial policing” doctrine used in the 1939 Arab revolt prior the Zionist rebellion.  
Based on this experience and their institutional schema favoring kinetic operations, 
General Montgomery and many other British commanders believed that if British forces 
were given enough latitude in Palestine by the British civil authorities to employ large-
scale, offensive operations, they could crush the Zionist insurgency by destroying its 
active elements, coercing other members of the Yishuv into opposing the insurgents, and 
controlling Jewish population centers.  History has demonstrated that these were flawed 
assumptions..   
According to Charters there were two periods during the Zionist 
revolt when the British conducted “offensive operations”: June 29 to September of 1946 
and March through August of 1947.  While Charters calls these “offensive operations” 
the truly distinguishing difference between “offensive operations” and security, or 
“peacekeeping phase[s]” of the British COIN campaign in Palestine was the size, 
suddenness and intensity of the “offensive operations in comparison to the sustained 
actions of British units during the “peacekeeping phases.  In true punitive strike and 
sweep fashion, troops executed massive cordon and search operations, raids and mass 
arrests.  They were therefore offensive in the same sense that previous British punitive 
strike and sweep operations were offensive: troops deployed into and secured areas, 
conducted an intense series of searches and arrests, and either withdrew completely or 
left a reduced force in the area to conduct security operations.  This was completely 
consistent with “imperial policing” doctrine and also rooted in the “small wars” 
philosophy.  Montgomery and other British commanders envisioned theses operations as 
the key to striking the insurgents in a decisive blow and regaining control.  In Palestine, 
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the British imposed a modified version of martial law they designated as “statutory 
marital law” which was distinguished from the standard act of military rule by retention 
of executive power by the British High Commissioner.  Although these operations were 
intended to take the initiative from the insurgents in one swift blow and reestablish 
British control in Palestine, in reality they mostly had the punitive effects of completely 
disrupting and punishing the Jewish population.   
In Operation AGATHA, the first major British sweep operation, 
the stated objectives were to search the buildings belonging to known and suspected 
insurgents and organizations supporting insurgents, like the Jewish Agency headquarters, 
and arrest as much of the suspected and know insurgent leadership as possible.  
According to Charters, before dawn on the 29th of July “parties of the Royal Signals 
troops…occupied all exchanges and suspended all telephone communications across 
Palestine for more than three hours.”171  As communications were being cut off “10,000 
troops and 7000 police deployed to their operational targets, the three main cities and 30 
rural settlements.”172  Almost 3,000 men were arrested, and 33 weapons caches were 
discovered during the operation.  Operation AGATHA’s effects on civilians and the 
Yishuv’s reaction were almost entirely negative.  With the memory of the Holocaust 
undoubtedly very fresh in the Jewish population, Jewish civilians were angered at the 
sight of masses of Jewish men and women being rounded up and caged for interrogation 
even though most were released.  In one brief account of the operation Nicholas Bethell 
describes the interactions between soldiers and civilians during the operation:  
[t]he troops faced widespread passive resistance from the settlers, who 
locked their gates, blocked the entrances with tractors and their own 
bodies, refused to cooperate in identification and fingerprinting, shouted 
insults and occasionally threw missiles at the soldiers.  According to 
Jewish witnesses, some soldiers retaliated by shouting Nazi slogans, 
looting property and using unnecessary violence.173 
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Bethell’s account illustrates one important effect of the operation that was completely 
contrary to its intent.  Operation Agatha provided fodder for Zionist propaganda cells 
who could frame British actions as Nazi-like and whether the British brutality was as 
harsh as some of the Jewish settlers claimed was not as important as the fact that the 
British further alienated the population by conducting the operation.  While the British 
tactics were far from being as vicious as those employed in previous insurgencies, like 
Iraq, Operation Agatha was still considered punitive in nature by many Jews and the 
operation failed to achieve its tactical objectives.    
The primary purpose of these operations was to eliminate or 
severely diminish the operational capabilities of the insurgency by capturing its 
leadership.  The British actually arrested many of the more moderate leaders of the 
insurgency from the Haganah and the Jewish Agency but missed the more radical and 
violent members of IZL and LEHI.  With the moderate leaders of the Jewish Agency 
either gone or alienated from the British and the Haganah out of the picture, the IZL and 
LEHI were able to consolidate their power then execute operations with minimal 
interference.  The ineffectiveness of the British sweeps and the capabilities of the 
insurgents were clear less than a month after Operation Agatha on 22 July when the IZL 
bombed the British Army headquarters and the offices of the Palestinian Secretariat in the 
King David Hotel in Jerusalem.  The bombing killed 91 people (48 Arabs, 17 Jews, 28 
British and five others).  The British responded to this attack with Operation Shark in 
which they sealed off Tel Aviv and conducted house to house searches.  However by 
most accounts Operation Shark was also a failure because the British lacked accurate 
intelligence which would have allowed them to target and capture insurgent leaders.  
Ultimately, like Agatha, Operation Shark had no appreciable effect on the insurgency.   
In the second episode of “offensive operations” from March to 
August of 1947 the British essentially pulled out all of the stops in a final effort to regain 
control of Palestine and retain influence there.  They imposed “statutory marital law” in 
urban centers including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, employed special operations units who 
carried out covert actions based on intelligence they gathered through surveillance, 
executed countless cordon and search operations, and arrested hundreds.  According to 
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Charters for example, in Tel Aviv alone the British “carried out 63 search operations 
from May through July 1947.”  In “controlled areas” where the British imposed martial 
law, conducted constant patrolling, and multiple searches they were able to counter the 
insurgents’ operations.   For example, in Tel Aviv the “rate of insurgent operations 
declined by more than 50 per cent in the last quarter of 1947.   
The fact remains though that these operations were only 
marginally successful and did not strike the decisive blow to the insurgency, create 
political and military opportunity for Zionist-British rapprochement, or reestablish 
sustainable British control in Palestine as the commanders had planned.  Regardless of 
whether these tactics were employed as part of sustained “peacekeeping operations,” or 
in the large-scale sweeps, they failed to achieve the British objectives for many reasons 
and primary among these was the lack of British intelligence about the insurgents.  In 
fact, to a large degree this was a function of British-Zionist antagonisms produced by the 
tactics employed by the British during all phases of their operations.  As we have 
discussed, there were numerous other factors leading to the British defeat in Palestine, 
but on a tactical level, the British inability to gain an accurate awareness of the enemy 
situation was a decisive factor because they attempted to compensate for missing 
intelligence by increased activity.  While Montgomery and other like-minded officers 
constantly pressed for more operational freedom in Palestine to crush the rebellion, they 
never really invested their organizational energy into pursuing other strategies beyond 
those that Cunningham and his supporters could enforce when the strategic tide shifted in 
the High Commissioner’s favor.  Again, this reduces the matter for ease of analysis, but it 
does accurately illustrate the situation in Palestine during the revolt and a crucial factor 
contributing to the British failure there.  While it is important to acknowledge that 
effective COIN strategies include tactics that deny sanctuary and maneuverability to 
insurgents through focused and constant efforts by COIN forces to do so, these tactics are 
counterproductive unless they are driven by intelligence.  These lessons as well as the 
counterproductive effects of punitive operations were clearly illustrated in the British 
campaign in Palestine.   
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 E. CONCLUSION 
FM 3-24 reflects a clear relationship between the ultimate lessons the British 
learned in their COIN campaigns during the first half of the twentieth century and the 
considerations included in LLOs.  Even though they failed to adequately do so, the 
British understood the importance of building host nation forces, deploying their units 
into the population and developing the host nation government.  For example, they 
employed these strategies in Iraq through political officers and the establishment of a 
20,000-man police force in Palestine.  The British conducted a “plebiscite” under A.T. 
Wilson’s supervision in Iraq to ostensibly garner input from Iraqis on the type of 
government they desired.  However as we have seen, this was at best a half-hearted effort 
by the British to include Iraqis in determining their own political future.  At worst, this is 
an illustration of the cynical manipulation of a system by one man to fit his visions of 
what Iraq should be.  It also demonstrates how potentially effective strategies focused on 
the population and political institution development can be mostly negated by their 
inconsistent employment and other strategies that focus on the insurgents as the center of 
gravity in counterinsurgency.  Likewise, British strategies against insurgents and tactics 
designed to crush and cow rebels into submission, establish expedient order by excluding 
uncooperative elements of society from political development, and infighting in the 
British civil and military command structure negated the progress produced by the 
effective British strategies.  The LLOs in FM 3-24 illustrate a keen awareness of this and 
articulate strategies that attempt to avoid these pitfalls.  
Therefore, the relationship of the LLOs in FM 3-24 to the two British case studies 
is one in which the British COIN strategies in Iraq and Palestine revealed the importance 
of intelligence, political development, and sustained operations by the British failure to 
adequately employ these which has helped the authors of FM 3-24 to focus the LLOs in 
these important areas.  Most importantly, all of the LLOs in FM 3-24 reflect a keen 
awareness of the damage of punitive actions and the importance of public perception and 
political inclusion.  In both Iraq and Palestine, the British failed to grasp this important 
causal dynamic even though there were members of the military and civil command 
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structure, like Major S.E. Hedgecock and Cunningham, who clearly appreciated the 
consequences of punitive actions and public perception.  This is where FM 3-24 truly 
distinguishes itself from British COIN doctrine in Iraq and Palestine.  The primacy of 
political and public development and the rule of law and the damage of punitive, large-
scale operations are clearly illustrated in the LLOs.  It is undeniable that the British 
defeated the rebellion in Iraq by sheer force and reestablished order.  But, this expedient 
application of force ultimately served to destabilize Iraq and set the precedent for 
brutality in the country as an acceptable instrument of state control.  FM 3-24 clearly 
asserts that combat operations are part of COIN, but as the British actions in Iraq and 
Palestine indicate, these tactics must be measured and selective.  This, of course, is 
another major lesson the FM has incorporated into the LLOs and one that is also woven 




IV. FRENCH PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA 1954-1962 
It is inconceivable that Algeria should secede from Metropolitan France.  
This should be clear forever to all, in Algeria, in Metropolitan France, and 
abroad.  Algeria is France, and not a foreign country under our protection. 
-M. Mendes-France, 1954174 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the French war in Algeria against the Force de liberation 
national (FLN) from 1954-1962 when independence was declared for Algeria.  We begin 
this Chapter with a brief discussion of the background of French Algeria and the events 
that led up to the November 1954 revolution.  Following that we discuss the 
counterinsurgent doctrine that was developed by the French during the war.  Next we 
discuss the specific tactics that the French employed in an effort to follow that doctrine 
and defeat the FLN or fellaghas.  In the conclusion we look at how the French tactics and 
doctrine during the war in Algeria match up with the new US COIN manual and the 
logical lines of operation that are used there. We conclude that while French doctrine and 
tactics match with the new FM, they still were unable to translate tactical victory into 
strategic success. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The French first landed in Algeria in 1830 in an attempt to colonize the country 
and stop the piracy that had become a real problem emanating from Northern Africa.175  
France officially annexed Algeria in 1834 and for the next 128 years dominated the 
country.  France saw Algeria as an important colony for many reasons, not the least of 
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which was the expectation of large oil and gas reserves in the Sahara in western Algeria, 
which were discovered in 1956.176  Also important to the French was that Algiers had 
served as the main base for the forces of Free France during WWII.   
Twice before the revolution that began in 1954, the French army had put down 
independence movements in Algeria.  The first time, from 1832-1847, the French army 
battled against Abd-el-Kadr, a young Algerian seeking to unite Algeria and fight against 
the occupiers.177  The French adopted a heavy handed scorched earth campaign that 
eventually caused el-Kadr to surrender.  The second movement began in the town of Setif 
in 1945 following V.E., or victory in Europe day when the Nazis surrendered to the 
Allied forces.  Muslims in Setif marched in protest seeking independence and broke out 
in a riot with French officials when shots were fired.  The riots continued for five days, 
during which over 100 European settler, or pied noirs were killed.  The French retaliated 
again with a heavy handed military solution killing, by some conservative estimates, 
1300 Muslims.178  
As this evidence points out, the movement for independence in Algeria was 
hardly a new phenomenon in 1954.  This Chapter of independence and nationalism began 
in earnest with the meeting of leading revolutionary members from all over Algeria in 
July of 1954 following the French defeat in Indochina.  This group decided that it was 
time to begin the revolution, and decided on 1 November 1954 as the time to begin, 
which was All Saints Day.179  The aim of this movement was to be “an unlimited 
revolution to continue until full independence was achieved.”180 
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C. FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENT DOCTRINE – GUERRE 
REVOLUTIONNAIRE 
The French army came into the war in Algeria fresh from a defeat at the hands of 
the Vietminh in Vietnam.  This defeat had been a stinging one for the French army, and 
France as a whole.  The war fought there had been a people’s war to use the words of 
Mao.  The French had been defeated by a smaller force of guerilla fighters, badly 
equipped, that had gained the support of the population, a stunning defeat for them.  It 
could then be expected that an army coming out of a fight that it had lost, might take a 
few lessons that it had learned and adopt a new way of fighting to deal with the threat that 
they had just faced.  This however was not the case for the French army.  No manual of 
how to fight a counterinsurgent (COIN) war was produced before the war in Algeria 
began.   
That there was no new doctrine was one of the main points made by David 
Galula.  Galula states “[t]he sad truth was that in spite of all our past experience, we had 
no single, official doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare.”181  Galula argues that the lack 
of new doctrine was one of the main reasons that prior to 1956 the French were not doing 
well militarily in Algeria.  The lack of doctrine created an ad-hoc atmosphere where 
leaders fell into one of two groups, either warriors or psychologist.182  The warriors were 
focused on military action, failing to see that the population was key in this battle.  The 
psychologists on the other hand believed that psychological action was the key to 
everything, and would bring about victory in Algeria.183  Company commanders were 
left on their own with orders that stated nothing more than “pacify.”   
During the early stages of the war in Algeria a corps of officers that had served in 
Indochina were brought together to come up with a doctrinal answer to the challenge of 
insurgent warfare.  Members of this group included Colonels Antoine Argoud, Charles 
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Lacheroy, and Jean Gardes.184  These men were deeply affected by their service in 
Indochina and saw the struggle as a struggle in which the political and social aspects of 
the fight were more important than the military one.  They were heavily influenced by 
Mao, and the basis of their strategy was a counter to Mao’s theory on revolution.  French 
COIN doctrine was rooted in the notion of “eradicating the benign environment” that 
guerrillas lived in.185   
Based on their experience in Indo-china they saw the insurgents as being created 
by an outside force and the outside force that they feared was communism.186  They did 
not believe that a local movement, i.e. nationalism, was capable of creating a movement 
that would lead to an insurgency.  They also did not believe that it was possible for the 
incumbents to fully win a COIN campaign.  They believed that  
The best that the incumbents might hope for is to restrict the insurgents to 
the establishment of cells, to the spreading of propaganda, to a degree of 
sabotage and terror that can be accepted by the government and society.187 
 
Their idea of to defeat the insurgents can be best summarized by a statement that 
was used by one of the formulators of the French doctrine, Colonel Argoud, who used the 
phrase “Protect Them; Involve Them; Control Them” referring to the population that was 
to become the center of the French doctrine.188  In order to accomplish this there was a 
five step process outlined in the French doctrine, followed by two types of missions to 
complete the five steps.  Peter Paret did a very succinct job of outlining these steps in his 
book French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria.  The first of the five 
steps was to cut off the rebels from all foreign assistance, something that had haunted the 
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French in Indochina where the Vietminh had been assisted by the Chinese.  The next step 
was to destroy the large groupings of guerrilla fighters.  This was to be done not purely 
with military might, but through the use of psychological operations to take advantage of 
military successes and demoralize the enemy.  The third step included protecting the 
essential economic centers in the country as well as the population.  The writers of the 
doctrine saw the best way to do this as through the use of a “network of small posts over 
the area” that could protect hamlets as well as be useful in influencing the local 
population.189  Step four was to resettle communities as necessary to facilitate their 
protection as well as deny the enemy access to them.  Lastly, any captured guerrillas must 
be re-educated.   
These five steps could then be consolidated more easily into two main mission 
types that were to be used, destruction and construction.  Each of the steps fell into one of 
these missions and they were to be executed together.  Destruction was to come first and 
set the conditions for construction, though the two missions could be occurring 
simultaneously in some areas.  General Allard, a French Corp Commander at the time of 
the war in Algeria summed it up best when he said “To destroy without building up 
would mean useless labor; to build without first destroying would be a delusion.”190  We 
will go into further detail on the tactics used as part of each of these missions later in the 
Chapter. 
As part of the new doctrine the French saw psychological operations as an 
integral aspect of every operation.  To this end the army inserted a section into staffs and 
at command headquarters called the 5th Bureau.  This bureau was responsible for two 
missions.  The first was to protect French morale and unity of purpose.191  Their other 
mission was psychological warfare against the enemy.  In order to accomplish their first 
mission the bureau focused on the army units in Algeria, as well as the French public.  
They would show current event films, as well as press releases that emphasized French 
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successes.  In targeting the Algerians they would execute leaflet drops, broadcast music 
and propaganda, and create posters that emphasized the French aspects of Algeria.192  
Each Corp in Algeria was equipped with a loudspeaker and pamphlet company that was 
responsible for producing their psychological operations products.  This company was 
equipped with duplicating machines, printing presses, loudspeakers, screens and 
projectors, and a workshop to produce posters.193  So psychological operations were an 
important part of the French effort in Algeria. 
The tactics that the French army employed to successfully execute this doctrine is 
the focus of the rest of this Chapter, however it is worth noting here that during the war in 
Algeria there was a training school set up to teach those officers and non-commissioned 
officers heading to Algeria the new doctrine, as well as the specifics of Algeria.  This 
school was located at Arzew east of Oran.  It was the last step before joining a unit for 
those headed to Algeria, and was opened in 1956.  There were four major themes taught 
at Arzew: Muslim sociology, revolutionary warfare (the new doctrine), the adversary and 
his ways, and the tactical and psychological struggle against the rebellion.194  The school 
was broken down in to groups based on what the individuals job was going to be.  Majors 
and Captains attended the school for district and sub-district commanders and Colonels 
attended the school for sector commanders.195  The center closed in 1962 when the 
French left Algeria. 
D. FRENCH TACTICS - DESTRUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION 
As noted earlier, at the beginning of the war in Algeria there was no unifying 
French doctrine on how to fight a COIN campaign.  This lead to widely disjointed efforts 
early on, with dramatically different outcomes in neighboring sectors.  Initial French 
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efforts focused on search and destroy missions to hunt down and kill the fellaghas.  
Ineffective techniques coupled with too few soldiers in Algeria led to a gradual 
worsening of the situation until 1955 when the French government decided to recall 
reservists to send to Algeria.  The increase in troop levels combined with the new 
doctrine that started to trickle down in 1956 led to a dramatic change in the situation 
militarily in Algeria.   
1. Destruction 
The main goal of the destruction phase of French operations was to uncover, 
dismantle, and repress the FLN politico-admin centers as well as to chase down and 
annihilate the insurgents.196  This phase of operations was essentially an attempt to 
establish a basic level of security for the population in order to move on to the next phase 
of operations, construction. 
The first step in this phase was to divide the country up into what was known as 
the quadrillage or grid.  The whole of the country was divided up into sectors that static 
forces were permanently assigned to.  That sector was their responsibility; they would 
track the rebels there and work with the population.  This was supplemented with a 
contingent of mobile forces that would be used to reinforce sectors that needed more 
support during periods of intense fellagha activity.   
Another important aspect of this phase, one which came directly from the five 
steps necessary to defeat insurgents in the new French doctrine, was the sealing of the 
Algerian border to close off the support that the FLN had been receiving from Tunisia 
and Morocco.  Between 1956 and 1958 a fence on both borders of Algeria was 
constructed to stop the flow of men and arms into Algeria.  Prior to the construction of 
the fence an average of 1000 weapons a month were flowing into Algeria.197  This fence 
became known as the Morice Line and was constructed out of a series of electrified 
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fences, barbed wire, land mines, floodlights and watchtowers.198  Portions of the border 
not covered by the barrier, largely desert regions, were patrolled by French 
reconnaissance aircraft as well as helicopters.  If an FLN convoy was spotted in the 
desert, French Para’s were flown in by helicopter to interdict them.199  The completion of 
this barrier had a devastating effect on the FLN.  Prior to its completion the FLN was able 
to recruit and arm a replacement for every fighter that it lost.  Afterwards, as Gil Merom 
states, 
The FLN was deprived of much of the weapons, fresh manpower, and 
other essential logistics that it needed in order to replace its losses and 
continue to initiate actions.200 
 
In each sector of the quadrillage search and destroy mission were still executed.  
These missions followed a typical operational setup.  There were two forces in the search 
and destroy mission, le bouclage, the ring, and le ratissage, the rake.  An area where 
fellaghas were suspected of hiding was surrounded on three sides by the ring, the rake 
would then begin in the open side and comb the area, hopefully either engaging the 
enemy that was forced into the open, or pushing the fellaghas to the units making up the 
ring.  This type of mission was carried out in every sector in Algeria right up until the end 
of the war.   
Later in the war, after 1958, an operational shift took place.  There was a 
realization that operations carried out with large forces were not the way to ultimately 
defeat the FLN, and there was a shift to smaller more targeted operations against point 
targets.  This realization, coupled with the addition to the French arsenal of American 
helicopters, led to the shift of more a more air mobile focus, carried out by smaller more 
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elite units.201  FLN forces were located typically by reconnaissance aircraft, and French 
forces were flown, either by helicopter or troop transport, and inserted to interdict the 
rebels.202  Once a reasonable level of security had been achieved it allowed the French to 
switch from destruction operations into construction operations, which were the focus of 
the static forces assigned to each sector in the quadrillage. 
2. Construction 
One of the most important ideas to come out of the new French doctrine was the 
importance of protecting the population.  The French accomplished this in a few different 
ways.  The first way that they protected the population was through the establishment of 
local garrisons in most of the hamlets located in the countryside.  By garrisoning troops 
in the town with the locals the army attempted to “put French troops in direct contact 
with the Muslims, turning each (soldier) into a kind of ambassador to the Muslim 
population.”203  Soldiers that lived in the hamlets would conduct a census of the local 
population, and by living with the population for months or even years at a time, they 
would come to have a sense of who belonged and who didn’t.  This made it extremely 
difficult for the FLN to infiltrate anyone into a town that had a garrison.   
Another important, although controversial, tactic to protect the population for the 
French as part of their construction operations, was the resettlement of entire villages that 
were deemed either too distant or isolated to be controlled, or the village was located too 
close to the border and therefore to easy for the FLN to control.  These villages were then 
placed into what the French called self-defense hamlets, compounds constructed by the 
French that had been surrounded by barbed wire and watchtowers.  Eventually once a  
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period of indoctrination had been completed, in which the villagers were educated on 
French power, the villagers were given arms and following a period of training, expected 
to defend themselves from the FLN.204   
This system had its benefits, as FLN activity in these resettled villages was almost 
nonexistent; however as a long term policy it had its negatives as well.  Resettling an 
entire village, against their will, is certainly not the way to win over a population that has 
been supporting the FLN up to this point.  It was nearly impossible to completely prevent 
FLN infiltration of the camp, and they became a breeding ground for new FLN members.  
By 1959 the French government had realized that this was a serious problem in the 
making, and ordered the resettlement efforts to stop, as well as ordering improvements to 
be made to the camps that already existed.205   
One prominent aspect of the French construction effort was the establishment in 
1955 of the Sections Administratives Specialisees or SAS.  The SAS were an elite corp. 
of highly trained Lieutenants and Captains that spoke fluent Arabic, and were experts on 
the culture and traditions of the area.  Essentially these men became the French 
administrators in remote areas of Algeria and were experts on everything from agriculture 
to how to build houses.206  To help them accomplish their task they were organized into 
sections with the officer, an interpreter, a few civilian specialists in either agriculture or 
education, a clerical soldier, and a radio operator.207  Often operating in isolation with 
nothing more than local guards to protect them, these men were frequently the targets of 
FLN attacks.208  Their job was complex, and included civil administration, from 
improving local sanitation, to achieving better health care for Muslims in their area, as 
well as military functions.  They became important sources of intelligence for French 
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units operating in their sectors.  Though these units were highly effective, there were 
never enough of them during the war in Algeria.  High selection standards combined with 
the dangers involved in the duty limited the number of candidates.  By the end of 1959 
there were “1287 officers serving in the approximately 660 sections, assisted by 661 
NCOs and 2921 civilian specialists.”209 
The SAS played a highly important role in the French campaign in Algeria, and 
were effective in their tasks.  However, not all of the Blue Kepis as they were called, 
were focused on improving life for the Algerians.  There were many bad SAS officers in 
Algeria who ran what were known as “intelligence centers” where torture of suspects was 
the norm.210  One of the lasting legacies of the French campaign in Algeria is the 
widespread use of torture by the French to gain information to use against the FLN.  
Torture was not a part of the French doctrine of guerre revolutionnaire but was an 
unfortunate part of its reality.211  Detailed accounts of the use of torture to gain 
intelligence are readily available.  One account of the battle of Algiers written by General 
Paul Aussaresses, a French intelligence officer at the time of the battle, called the Battle 
of the Casbah goes into great detail on the French use of torture.  Since it was not an 
official part of the French doctrine in Algeria we will not go into further examination of 
torture other than to say that it was widely used as a tactic. 
Establishing a sizeable force of native soldiers was also important to the French 
doctrine.  This manifested itself in Algeria through the establishment of a variety of host 
nation security forces.  The largest and most widely used of these forces was the Harkas.  
These were made up of Muslim troops organized into squads commanded by a French 
NCO or Officer.212  These soldiers were used as a supplemental force to the French 
where there were not enough French soldiers.  Commanders in their own quarter were 
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allowed to recruit harkis from their area to serve in their units.  These men would 
undergo a period of training, after which time they served as auxiliaries to the French 
forces.  Frequently the harkis lived in their own hamlet, worked with the French during 
the day, and went home at night to help defend their hamlet.213  As time passed and the 
French were more and more successful against the FLN, more and more Algerians 
volunteered to become harkas.  In January of 1957 there were approximately 2200 
harkas working with the French; by June of 1960 the number had grown to nearly 
58000.214   
The mahkzan were another of the Algerian security forces used by the French.  
These men were used as guards and messengers by the French civil affairs teams, and 
also to guard the SAS.215  The number of mahkzan was considerably smaller than the 
harkas, however they played a vital role in protecting the vulnerable SAS in isolated 
locations.  Also hired by the French were local police, auxiliary police, and several 
special commando groups made up of former FLN terrorists that were employed to help 
track and capture members of the FLN.216  The large number of Muslims employed by 
the French and assisting in the effort to help destroy the FLN helped to give legitimacy to 
the French effort in Algeria.   
There was another aspect to the construction phase of operations for the French, 
the political aspect.  This area was largely handled by the SAS officers in each area that 
were responsible for the administration of that area.  The SAS officers fell under the 
authority of the civilian administrators and took their orders from the sub prefect or 
prefect that was in charge.217  There was an effort on some levels to include the local 
Algerians more in politics.  David Galula writes that he and other members of his 
battalion took to install local mayors in each hamlet that were then responsible for 
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projects and administration of their hamlet.  This was not the norm across the country as 
a whole however, and a comprehensive political solution, other than the SAS that were 
originally only intended as a bridge between the French and the Algerians, was lacking.  
This was symptomatic of French policy in Algeria as a whole.  There was no one 
overarching policy for the duration of the war, it took many different paths during the 
course of war.  This was due to the domestic political situation in France at the time, a 
situation in which the government collapsed and changed hands no less than three times. 
E. CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of the war in Algeria there was no French COIN doctrine.  One 
was developed while the army was closed with and engaging the enemy.  A very similar 
experience recently happened in the US Army with the new FM3-24, it was developed to 
deal with the lack of doctrine facing an army at war.  This is only the first of a number of 
similarities between the US doctrine and the French doctrine, as well as the French 
actions in Algeria.  The doctrine that was developed by the French in Algeria could have 
served as the basis for the doctrine in the new FM. 
When looking at the LLOs described in the new FM the first is combat 
operations\civil security operations.  Clearly the French followed this LLO in the war in 
Algeria.  For the first two years it was the focus of their efforts there.  That changed in 
1956; however the French maintained executing combat operations for the duration of the 
war.  Combat operations were the focus of the first mission that the French carried out 
following their new doctrine, destruction.  The establishment of the quadrillage and the 
ring and the rake search and destroy missions would fall into this LLO.  Much like the 
US doctrine states that combat operations “maintain a secure environment for the 
populace,”218 the French used destruction operations to establish security for them to 
move on to construction operations.   
In line with the next LLO, establishing host nation security forces, the French 
established a variety of Algerian populated units.  The harkas, the mahkzans, and the 
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local police auxiliaries are a few of these units.  Each unit served a different purpose, but 
all helped the French to defeat the FLN.  The large number of Algerians working 
alongside the French also helped to give them legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the 
Algerian population.  The exponential increase by year in the number of Algerians 
recruited into these forces is a testament to the increase in legitimacy that the French saw. 
There was one force in Algeria that was largely responsible for the next LLO, 
essential services, and that was the SAS.  The SAS corps was in charge of administration 
of local hamlets, education in their area, health care improvements, as well as civil 
infrastructure development.  These young officers had civilian experts to help them out 
with their efforts.  While the use of civilian experts is not explicitly stated in the new FM 
for this LLO, is most certainly alluded to as the US Army does not have the expertise on 
its own to conduct operations in this LLO.  The US Army’s version of the SAS, Civil 
Affairs officers, fill many of the same roles as the SAS, but have no civilian counterparts 
to assist them.   
Governance is the next LLO, and it is one that the French in Algeria did not 
follow very well.  This is partially understandable as it was their stated desire from the 
beginning of the war that Algeria was to stay a part of France.  There were already 
French administrators in Algeria, and so no large scale changes were implemented.  The 
SAS filled their role in helping to bridge the gap between the French prefects and the 
Algerian population, however there were too few of them to make a real difference 
nationally.  Merely having more French representation was not what the Algerians 
wanted anyway, they desired independence.  The French would have needed to have a 
vastly expanded program of including local Algerians in the political administration in 
Algeria to have any hope of having an effect on the population.  If a more comprehensive 
political program could have been devised and implemented at the peak of the military 
effectiveness in 1958, maybe there could have been a different outcome in Algeria.  It is, 
however, hard to have a lasting political solution to the problem in Algeria, when the 
political situation in France was so fragile at the time.  Therefore somewhat 
understandably the French efforts along this LLO were extremely weak at best. 
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The last LLO is economic development and here once again the French effort was 
less than whole hearted.  Prior to the war, Algeria was France’s number one trading 
partner in all of its colonies.  France was not attempting to build up economic 
infrastructure in Algeria, it was attempting to at least hold on to its own economic power 
by retaining its control over Algeria.  There were minor economic programs 
implemented, mostly by the SAS in the form of agricultural reforms, and an increase in 
jobs through local rebuilding efforts, but it was not a widespread national campaign.  As 
mentioned previously, another reason that France wanted to retain Algeria was due to the 
expectation that oil and gas reserves would be found in the Saharan portion of the 
country.  France was desperately in need of oil and gas after WWII, and so could hardly 
afford to walk away from a potentially large discovery of those commodities in Algeria.   
In following these LLOs for the most part, France had achieved a military victory 
over the FLN by 1959.  The number of FLN members in Algeria was dramatically 
reduced, and their access to weapons virtually non-existent.  As we showed earlier large 
numbers of Algerians were joining French security forces, and the situation in Algeria 
was drastically improved from two years before.  This all changed however when 
General Charles de Gaulle came to power.  By opening up negotiations with the FLN in 
1960 and stating that France would not stay in Algeria forever, he essentially killed the 
tidal wave of support that the French had won.  With no expectation that the French were 
going to stay in Algeria now, and the new found legitimacy that the FLN gained through 
de Gaulle agreeing to negotiate with them, the Algerian population once again turned its 
support back to whom they perceived to be the eventual victors.  That spelled doom for 
France, and two years later in 1962 Algeria gained its independence and the FLN came to 
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V. ISRAEL AND THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA 
The legal father of the suicide bomber is the Israeli checkpoint, whilst his 
mother is the house demolition. 
Zuhair Kurdi, Israeli journalist219 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter describes the tactics that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) used to 
counter terrorist threats during the al-Aqsa intifada.  We begin with a background on the 
intifada and discuss the evolution of IDF strategies and doctrine used during this time.   
Specific Israeli tactics that will be covered in this Chapter includes targeted 
assassinations, collective punishments, targeted raids, house demolitions, the construction 
of the security fence, and the use of checkpoints.  We conclude this Chapter by 
evaluating how effective IDF tactics were in achieving Israeli strategic objectives and the 
common MOE described earlier.  Additionally, we highlight similarities and differences 
between Israeli Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine and current US COIN doctrine.  In 
the conclusion we find that Israeli tactics were not in line with the new FM, however they 
still managed to gain tactical success that they were unable to translate into strategic 
success. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In the summer of 2000 the Israeli government was invested in another round of 
negotiations with Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA).  This was the latest 
in a series of talks over the course of the previous 25 years in an attempt to end the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  The breakdown of these talks, the Camp David II summit,  
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combined with the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, and the 
killing of several demonstrators there the next day set off what would come to be known 
as the al-Aqsa intifada.220   
This was a much different uprising than the first intifada had been thirteen years 
earlier.  While both originated out of a groundswell of public outrage, the first intifada 
carried mass Palestinian public support and participation all the way through to the 
end.221  In the second intifada, the mass public uprising only lasted for two months, after 
that it became a battle between the IDF and numerous factions of the Palestinian Security 
Services, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement; the civil uprising became a 
guerilla war and a terror campaign.222   
The IDF reacted to the intifada in the manner that it had reacted to all other 
attacks against the state of Israel, that is, with reprisals.  Initially the IDF began by merely 
reacting to Palestinian attacks against both the IDF as well as Israeli settlers with 
disproportionate force in an effort to break up protests and stop attacks.223  Typical 
engagements consisted of small arms fire from Israeli soldiers targeting Palestinians 
throwing Molotov cocktails or rocks.  During October 2000 alone estimates hold that the 
IDF fired over 1 million 5.56 caliber bullets.224   
However, as the intifada progressed Israel changed from reactionary defensive 
tactics to offensive tactics in 2001 following the election of Ariel Sharon to the Prime 
Ministry.  Sharon set a new strategy for defeating the intifada.  His new strategy was 
based on a policy with four main elements: securing Israeli citizens; ending Palestinian 
violence; preventing Palestinians from attaining any objectives through violent means; 
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and keeping open the possibility of returning to the negotiation table, but not under 
fire.225  The offensive tactics used included targeted assassinations, raids of Palestinian 
homes, as well as patrols in the occupied territories.  These offensive tactics took center 
stage as Israel adopted a more aggressive stance following the Passover massacre on 
March 27, 2002 in which thirty Israeli civilians were killed.226  Operation Defensive 
Shield was the first in a long series of offensive operations inside the occupied territories 
over the course of the next two years.  These operations were designed to “systematically 
dismantle terror infrastructures in the entire region,” as well as confiscate weapons, arrest 
Palestinians involved in violent acts, and to neutralize suicide bombers through a 
reoccupation of the towns in the occupied territories.227    
There were two key elements of the new defensive strategy: Irsraeli withdrawal 
from the occupied territories to reduce Palestinian resentment of Israeli occupation, and 
construction of a new security fence to close the border between Israel and the West 
bank.  The Gaza strip is already surrounded by an electric fence, so no border was 
deemed necessary there. As early as the summer of 2003 Ariel Sharon and his generals 
knew that these tactics were not having the desired effect and so sought a new 
strategy.228 
C. ISRAELI LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE 
Since the declaration of Israeli independence in 1948 the state of Israel has been 
in a nearly continuous state of conflict.  Israel has a unique history of LIC, beginning 
with operations against the British in what was then Palestine during the British Mandate 
period.  They have continued to fight LIC operations throughout the course of their 
history, though the majority of their wars between 1948 and 1982 were large scale high 
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intensity conflicts.  Since 1982 this has changed and Israel has been involved almost 
exclusively with LIC.  The nature of the engagements that Israel has been involved in has 
naturally shaped the formation of their national strategy and military doctrine. 
Sergio Catignani states that Israeli strategy has always been a three part strategy 
based on deterrence, early warning, and winning a decisive battle.229  This strategy is 
based on the fact that Israel in a small country and therefore cannot afford to be engaged 
in a war of attrition with another nation, therefore any conflict must be violent and end 
quickly.   
Zeev Maoz goes further in dissecting Israeli strategy and he argues that there are 
nine basic tenets to Israeli strategy.  His points are similar to Catignani’s, but more in 
depth. First, Israel must have a qualitative advantage over its enemies.  This means that 
Israel must have the most up to date equipment, hardware and software, in order to have a 
technological advantage over its enemies.  Second, Israel must be a nation at arms.  This 
can be seen in the makeup of the Israeli army.  The army is a force of conscripts backed 
up by a substantial reserve force.  This allows for a quick transition from peace to having 
a large army, without having the cost of maintaining a large army continuously.  Third, 
Israel must have an operational offense.  Israeli doctrine is offensive in nature because 
the decision makers believed that it was not possible for Israel to successfully fight a 
defensive battle.  Fourth, wars must be short to affect a quick decision, for the reasons 
explained above.  Fifth, Israel must obtain major power support for its wars.  Israel 
believes that they must have a major power backing them in each war for two reasons.  
Superpower support helps Israel obtain international consent for the military operations, 
which the country seeks, but more importantly superpowers provide a steady supply of 
munitions in the event of a protracted conflict.230  Sixth is the importance of autonomy of 
action.  Israel would prefer to go it alone in any engagement before having to resort to an 
alliance.  This allows Israel greater freedom of action.  Seventh is Cumulative deterrence.  
Israel believes that by constantly engaging in small conflicts with its neighbors it can 
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eventually wear down their desire to engage in another conflict.  Eighth is the 
controversial Samson option, i.e. Israeli use of nuclear weapons as a last resort.  This is 
purely theoretical tenet since Israel has never openly admitted to having nuclear weapons.  
Ninth is Israel’s determination of its final borders through the use of settlements.   
These tenets have formed the basis of Israeli doctrine for the last half a century, 
approximately.  As stated above, these tenets have led to Israeli doctrine being centered 
on the overwhelming use of force in small engagements in order to deter their opponents 
from wanting to engage in another conflict.  This is known as the policy of escalation 
dominance.231  The doctrine was focused on offensive operations using the most 
advanced technology available.  This started to change in the early 1990s following the 
first intifada.   
Taking the lessons learned by fighting the PLO in the first intifada the Israelis 
wrote a new doctrine based on what they called LIC.  The architect of this new doctrine 
was a reserve Military Intelligence officer named Colonel Shmuel Nir.  His doctrine was 
termed The Limited Confrontation.232  This doctrine was not a large change from 
previous IDF doctrine.  Essentially Nir saw LIC as a battle between the insurgents and 
the army to see who would wear down who first.  Nir stated that the purpose of the 
doctrine was,  
To undermine the adversary’s determination and to lead to the adversary’s 
abandoning his objectives, through a cumulative process of inflicting 
physical, economic, and psychological damage, and to lead the adversary 
to realize that his own armed engagement is hopeless.233 
 
This was similar to Israel’s strategy of cumulative deterrence, attempting to wear 
down the enemy through the use of prolonged engagement.   
The major difference between Nir’s doctrine and the previous Israeli doctrine was 
the importance of political considerations in Nir’s version.  In major conflict political 
considerations are secondary to military operational considerations, but for Nir in LIC 
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military operational consideration must come second to political considerations.  This is 
similar to the strategy stated in the new Army FM on COIN.  The other major distinction 
from previous Israeli doctrine was the emphasis in LIC as a prolonged struggle of 
attrition.  This was in sharp contrast to the Israeli tenet of short wars fought with a 
maximum of violence in order to reach a quick solution.   
This new doctrine of LIC was followed for the first two years of the second 
intifada and was the basis of the Israeli defensive strategy during this period.234  After the 
Netanya bombing, a suicide attack at the Park Hotel on the night before Passover in 
March 2002 that killed 30 Israelis, the Sharon led government disregarded this doctrine 
and resumed an offensive nature believing that the LIC doctrine had been a failure.   
D. APPLYING THE STRATEGY: ISRAELI LIC TACTICS DURING THE 
SECOND INTIFADA 
During the al-Aqsa intifada Israel used a wide range of tactics to counter the 
terrorist attacks against it.  These were a combination of offensive tactics, defensive 
tactics, as well as collective punishments.  Offensively the IDF used targeted 
assassination, targeted raids, and cordon and search operations.  Defensively the IDF 
relied on checkpoints on major Palestinian roads, the construction of the security fence, a 
vast human intelligence (HUMINT) network, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
coverage of the occupied territories.235  Some of the collective punishments implemented 
were the closure policy, curfews, house razing, and administrative detention.   
1. Offensive Tactics 
The most widely used IDF offensive tactic during the second intifada was targeted 
assassinations.  The use of this tactic was continuous during the intifada and was 
independent of the overall change in Israeli tactics from defensive to offensive.  During 
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the intifada Israel assassinated 273 targeted Palestinians, killing 170 bystanders in the 
process.236  Targeted assassinations fall under the Israeli “ticking bomb” policy, in which 
the IDF is allowed to kill any terrorist whom they have indications will conduct, or is 
planning, a suicide attack.237  A few examples of the tactic of targeted assassination 
include: November 9, 2000 Tanzim leader Husayn Abayat was killed with a laser guided 
missile; February 13, 2001 Hizbullah activist Ma’sud Iyyad was also killed with a laser 
guided missile238; July 22, 2002 Salah Shihada, a Hamas leader in Gaza was killed by a 
one ton bomb dropped from an F-16.239  
As we can see from the examples above, the Israelis employed various highly 
destructive weapons in targeted assassinations.  Initially Israel targeted individuals by 
dropping bombs from fighter aircraft such as the F-16.  Realizing the negative public 
relations impact of collateral damage, gradually the IDF and Israeli Air Force (IAF) 
transitioned to using attack helicopters, namely the Apache and Cobra gunships, firing 
laser guided missiles which provided more accurate fires and limited collateral 
damage.240  Recently the IAF has also started using UAV aircraft to fire these precision 
guided munitions, a platform that was most likely used in the 2004 killing of Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin.241  
These assassinations have also been conducted using sharpshooters in the 
occupied territories.  These sharpshooters are equipped with thermal imaging technology  
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and laser rangefinders.242  While the more spectacular assassinations using missiles and 
booby traps have garnered more attention, the majority of Palestinians targeted have been 
killed using sharpshooters.243 
For the most part Israel has limited its targeted assassinations to mid-level cell 
leaders in the occupied territories, those that actually choose the goal and method of 
targeting.244  This is in an attempt to break the contact between top leaders of cells and 
the foot soldiers carrying out the attacks.  Not focusing on senior leaders, unless 
necessary, also has the advantage of not creating as much public outcry, since most mid 
level leaders are unknown to the public.245  The theory of who to target is explained by 
Gal Luft: 
Israel has always believed that draining the swamp is more important than 
fighting the mosquitoes: the infrastructure of terrorist organizations, those 
who initiate, plan, or facilitate terror attacks are just as culpable as those 
who actually pull the trigger.246 
While targeted assassination has been a favored tactic of the IDF and the Israeli 
population, it has also been the tactic that has garnered the most condemnation 
internationally.  Many have challenged the legality of the tactic, citing customary 
international law that outlaws assassinations.247  Israel counters this with the argument 
that they are at war with the Palestinians and so are merely attacking military targets.248  
The legality of this issue is open to debate, however the tactic remains in use for Israel.   
The next tactic that Israel has used extensively in the occupied territories is the 
targeted raid.  Israel has a vast HUMINT network, supplemented by UAV coverage, that 
                                                 
242  Catignani, The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap between Israeli Counter-
Insurgency Strategy and Tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, 67. 
243  Hammami and Tamari, Anatomy of another Rebellion, 9. 
244  Morag, Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case, 309. 
245  Luft, The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing, 7. 
246  Ibid., 7. 
247  Efraim Inbar and Merkaz Besa le-meḥḳarim asṭraṭegiyim, Democracies and Small Wars (London; 
Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2003), 148. 
248  Ibid., 150. 
99 
 
supplies them with real time intelligence.249  This intelligence is then exploited to kill or 
capture specific terrorists and prosecute what are sometimes known as “Time Sensitive 
Targets.”  A tactic also employed by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, targeted raids 
provide the added advantage to the Israelis of minimizing collateral damage.  These 
missions are also less invasive, more effective, and “domestically and internationally less 
controversial due to the stealth and rapidity with which they are carried out.”250 
The opposite of the targeted raid is the cordon and search operation.  This tactic is 
used to seal off a whole town, or portion of a town, the cordon, and then systematically 
search and clear that section.  This tactic was first used in the intifada during October and 
November of 2001 when the towns of Bayt Jala, Bethlehem, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, 
Ramallah, and Tulkarm were isolated and searched in an effort to find those responsible 
for the assassination of Israeli tourism minister Rehavam Ze’evi.251  This tactic was used 
extensively from February 2002- October 2004 in an effort to locate supplies used for 
suicide bombings, as well as keep the terrorists moving and occupied with trying to stay 
alive rather than planning terrorist attacks.   
2. Defensive Tactics   
The IDF has also used a number of defensive tactics to combat the Palestinian 
terror threat.  The most commonly used defensive tactic by the IDF is the use of 
checkpoints on major roads, both inside the occupied territories as well as roads leading 
into Israel itself.  These checkpoints are most often used to search people and vehicles to 
curb the flow of weapons and explosives between cities and into Israel.  These 
checkpoints may be set up for extended periods, or may only last for a few hours.  Used 
in conjunction with these checkpoints is a pass system, that allows only those that have a 
pass entrance into Israel, and then only for work.   
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The most provocative defensive tactic used by Israel is the construction of the 
security fence between the West Bank and Israel.  This fence was constructed in order to 
prevent the entry of Palestinians, especially suicide bombers, into Israel.252  According to 
the Israeli Ministry of Defense there are five main reasons for the security fence, these 
are:  
Prevention of terror and weapons emanating from Judea and Samaria into 
Israel; prevention and thwarting of uncontrolled passage of pedestrians, 
cars and cargo from Judea and Samaria into Israel; minimizing transfer of 
weapons from Israel to the areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority; 
prevention of effective shooting against Israeli population and vital 
infrastructure installations; and law enforcement.253 
The idea for the fence was actually not conceived in either the military or political 
arena in Israel, rather it came from an outcry of public opinion.  Ariel Sharon had 
opposed the construction of the fence believing, “that it would cut off Israel from the 
occupied territories, which he hoped to eventually annex to the Jewish state.”254  
Construction of this fence began in the summer of 2003, and continues today.   
The fence is a mix of concrete barriers, concrete sections of wall, barbed wire 
fencing, guard towers, and electronic sensors and monitors.  In some areas that fence is 
more than eight meters high, with the stated purpose of, “preventing sniper attacks 
against Israeli citizens in the area.”255  Other sections of the fence are nothing more than 
chicken wire fence with barbed wire strung along the top, often in multiple layers.  (See 
Figure 1 for current route of the security wall.) 
The routing of the wall has been a major political concern for Israel since it 
began.  The fence has been condemned internationally because it does not conform to the 
green line, which is the 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank.  Many 
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Palestinians argue that the fence is not being used for security purposes to stop terror, 
rather it is being built to separate many Palestinian farmers from their crops, and villages 
from their water resources.256  In 2004 the International Court of Justice issued an 
advisory ruling to the United Nations that the security fence that Israel was constructing 
was illegal under international law.257  
The legality of the fence aside, it has been an effective tool for Israel.  Since the 
construction of the fence began in 2003, terror attacks in Israel have declined 
approximately forty percent.  The numbers of Israelis killed peaks in 2002 at 451, the 
year before construction of the fence began, and drop precipitously every year thereafter.  
In 2003 214 Israelis were killed as a result of terror attacks.  That number fell to 117 in 
2004, and the numbers of Israelis killed and wounded in terror attacks has continued to 
fall till the present day.  While there are other factors that may impact the number of 
casualties that Israel suffers, such as political infighting between Palestinian groups or 
truces between Israel and the Palestinians, it is hard to argue that the barrier has not had a 
significant impact.  Figure 2 shows the Israeli casualties, both killed and wounded from 
2000 when the Intifada started, until 2006.258 
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Figure 3.   Image of the route of the Israeli security fence.259 
                                                 




Figure 4.   Graphs showing the decline in Israeli casualties from 2000 to 2006.260 
3. Collective Punishments 
Since the early 1990s Israel has employed a number of restrictive policies against 
the Palestinian population in the occupied territories.   They are intended to restrict the 
flow of terrorists and materials from one portion of the territories to another, and to limit 
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the flow of these people and material into Israel.  The Israelis employed three restrictive 
tactics during the second intifada: general closure, internal closure, and curfew.261 
During a general closure period, the occupied territories are essentially divided 
into three areas: the West bank, Gaza, and east Jerusalem.  Movement between these 
areas is extremely difficult as even those that have the required permits may not be able 
to exit any of these territories, not even to go to work.262 Previously issued permits may 
be revoked, and new permits are not issued during this time.  Goods traveling between 
the occupied territories and Israel are also restricted during a general closure.263  General 
closures are typically implemented as a response to suicide bomb attacks in Israel, and 
also as an extra security measure during Jewish holidays.   
The second type of collective punishment is an internal closure.  Internal closures 
are different than general closures in that only a specific town or village is isolated and 
sealed.   These towns are usually sealed off using a combination of checkpoints manned 
by IDF forces, blockades on alternate exit points, and ditches dug around the town.264  
The blockades usually consist of concrete barriers or some other kind of obstacle.  During 
an internal closure, the only traffic allowed to come and go from the towns are 
emergency vehicles as well as food and medical supplies.265  Typically an internal 
closure is in response to specific intelligence that a terrorist, or terrorist group is hiding or 
operating from a specific town.  This closure is also used in conjunction with the targeted 
raid, or as part of a cordon and search operation.   
The use of a curfew is another collective punishment that is frequently used by the 
IDF.  The IDF has employed the tactics of curfews since 1987 during the first intifada.  
During a period of curfew there is to be no traffic, either foot or vehicle, on the roads of 
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the area under curfew.  Curfews confine individuals to their homes.266  These curfews 
may last only a few hours at a time, or may be imposed for days.  Curfew is usually 
imposed in an effort to halt attacks during a specific time period, or from a particular 
town.   
The final collective punishment that is in use by the IDF is the razing of homes of 
suspected terrorists.  In some areas homes surrounding roads used by Israeli settlers have 
been destroyed along with any crops within a three hundred meter range of the road.267  
Israel also has demolished the homes of suspected terrorists and their closest relatives.268  
Homes have also been demolished during combat operations in specific towns.  During 
Operation Defensive Shield Israeli bulldozers were used to knock down buildings 
creating alternate avenues of approach to specific targets due to the threat of some areas 
being booby trapped.269   
E. CONCLUSION 
The tactics that the IDF used during the second intifada were not consistent with 
the tactics outlined in the new FM, FM 3-24.  They did not take into account all of the  
logical lines of operation, instead focusing their efforts on offensive operations.  There 
was no emphasis on rebuilding infrastructure or on building up the local government in 
order to help affect a solution.  In fact, there was the opposite of both of these goals 
during the intifada.  Israel’s policy of assassinating terrorists and political leaders in 
Hamas has weakened the government instead of strengthening it.  While this tactic falls 
in line with Israel’s goal of lessening attacks on its citizens, it does nothing to help the 
root causes of the terrorism.     
Local infrastructure was also demolished, through home razing as well as through 
collateral damage during either airstrikes or artillery bombardments of Palestinian cities.  
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Essential services needed by the Palestinians are then supplied by groups like Hamas, 
which has the exact opposite effect of what Israel is trying to accomplish.  Instead of 
making them weaker, Hamas becomes stronger.   
As for the last LLO, economic development, Israel did nothing to help the 
occupied territories economically during the second intifada.  In fact the policies of 
closure and curfews devastated the Palestinian economy.  Eighty percent of the economic 
trade of the occupied territories is with Israel.270  This was almost completely halted 
during the periods of closure.  Curfews also hurt local businesses, as no one was allowed 
to leave their homes to shop, and so the businesses remained closed.  If the population 
was allowed to move around, it was for only one day a week, or for a few hours a day.271 
The focus of Israeli forces during the al-Aqsa intifada was clearly on offensive 
operations.  Israelis focused on attempting to kill or capture terrorist and suspected 
terrorists.  The strategy of the IDF went through three clear stages during the intifada.  
The first stage was from the beginning of the intifada in September of 2000 until Ariel 
Sharon was elected as the Prime Minister in March of 2001.  During this stage Israel was 
relying on their doctrine of reprisals, in line with their new LIC doctrine and was mainly 
reactive.  They predominantly employed the defensive tactics that I have outlined earlier 
in this Chapter, supplemented by some offensive measures.   
The second stage was from March 2001 until the summer of 2003.  During this 
stage Israel went on the offensive, striving to take the initiative in the battle and take the 
fight to the terrorists.  This was due to Sharon’s government believing that the LIC 
doctrine had been a failure up to that point.  This is evidenced by the large number of 
official operations that were executed by the IDF, to include Operation defensive Shield 
and Operation Determined Path.  This period ended in the summer of 2003 when the 
security fence’s construction began.  Though some offensive operations continued after 
the summer of 2003, they were not the focus as they had been during the previous fifteen 
months. 
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The last phase was a return to defensive operations.  This was in response to the 
admission by Ariel Sharon of the failure of his offensive campaign, and political pressure 
from within Israel.272  During this phase Israel focused once again on the security fence 
as well as checkpoints and curfews.  Offensive operations were conducted, but not on the 
scale of the operations conducted the year prior.   
While Israel has a new LIC manual that follows along with many of the ideas in 
FM 3-24 it clearly did not follow it during the entire Intifada.  However, this did not 
really hurt Israel all that much.  The tactics of the Intifada must be seen as a success 
given the Israeli stated policy of reducing the number of attacks to a livable level.  This 
Israel has clearly managed.  A cursory look at the casualty figures for Israeli civilians 
over the period of the Intifada shows a sharp decrease.  However, tactical victory has not 
translated to strategic success.  There still remains no solution to the Israeli – Palestinian 
conflict, and until a political solution is found, Israeli civilians will continue to be killed 
by Palestinian terrorists.   
                                                 






















This thesis attempts to determine whether FM 3-24 provides the best operational 
articulation of counterinsurgency theory and doctrine for U.S. COIN.  We assert that this 
is a function of how the new guidelines in FM 3-24 for conducting a COIN campaign 
align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency.  To determine this 
we analyzed the key elements of social science theories explaining contentious collective 
action, Islamic and Arab grievances and participation in organized violent behavior.  In 
addition, we analyzed where the Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs) in the FM aligned 
and diverged with COIN strategies employed in four Middle Eastern COIN campaigns. 
Based on the evidence, our finding is that FM 3-24 is a valuable base line 
doctrinal source for conducting COIN.  It provides focused strategies in the LLOs that 
integrate interdisciplinary sources from academia, existing COIN doctrine, and historical 
case studies.  The LLOs clearly situate the population as the centre of gravity in COIN 
and articulate strategies that are designed to develop mutually supporting efforts to 
establish stability and security which the FM identifies as the objective end state and we 
have defined as the common measure of effectiveness (MOE).  According to the FM, 
stability and security lead to Host-Nation legitimacy which is mostly a function of 
popular perception.  With that said, there are some significant problematic issues that we 
have identified in the FM that should be addressed.  In the next two sections we analyze 





1. Social Science Issues in FM 3-24 
As we discussed in Chapter II, the FM incorporates certain social-science theories 
that attempt to identify causality in contentious collective behavior such as those that 
employ social movement theory (SMT) to explain individual and group action.  For 
example, in Ted Robert Gurr’s Why Men Rebel and Eric Hoffer’s The True Beliver the 
authors propose socioeconomic and psychological explanations as the primary causal 
factors for rebellion.  However, their conclusions are problematic.  Contemporary 
research and alternative social movement theories indicate that collective and individual 
violence based on grievances and in support of causes is subject to significant intervening 
variables that significantly affect the opportunity and willingness of people to act against 
the state.  This is particularly true in the case of the Middle East.  For example according 
to Mohammed M. Hafez, “despite their plausibility and parsimony, the validity of 
socioeconomic and psychological explanations of Islamist rebellions must be challenged 
on both empirical and theoretical grounds.”273  Hafez asserts that the “psychological 
approach” claims that Islamist militancy is a product of “psychological alienation” 
resulting from the “breakdown of traditional solidarity” in Muslim societies which 
resulted from rapid and flawed modernization.274  
In his critique of these approaches Hafez contends that the majority of “Muslim 
societ[ies] experienced major social, economic and political changes and crises of 
poverty of excessive Westernization in the postcolonial era.  Yet many of these societies 
have not had to contend with high levels of Islamist rebellion or violence.275  He cites 
“basic economic and demographic indicators of…-Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Tunisia –prior to and during the early 1990s” to demonstrate that these countries were 
economically similar and as evidence that “[t]he mere existence of poverty and 
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deprivation is not sufficient to explain levels of Islamist rebellion.”276  In addition, he 
maintains that “Gurr’s frustration-aggression approach” is flawed because “as Leon 
Trotsky (1961:249) observed in 1932, “the mere existence of privation is not enough to 
cause insurrection; if it were, the masses would be always in revolt.”277 
Adopting the theory originated by McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow, Hafez submits an 
alternative, or “political process approach” for explaining Muslim rebellion.  His basic 
assertion is that “[t]he key to explaining their [Muslim] militancy is not economic 
stagnation or excessive secularization, but the lack of meaningful access to state 
institutions.”278  Indeed, he asserts that “[w]ith few exceptions, the combination of 
political exclusion and reactive and indiscriminate repression is both necessary and 
sufficient to explain the timing and scale of Islamist rebellion.”279  Hafez maintains that 
“Muslims rebel because of an ill-fated combination of institutional exclusion, on the one 
hand, and on the other, reactive and indiscriminate repression that threatens the 
organizational resources and personal lives of Islamists.”280 In fact, greater degrees of 
repression and exclusion from the state’s political institutions produce more radical and 
violent Islamists.281  He asserts that “rather than ask why does a movement become 
rebellious, a more appropriate question becomes what is the process by which a 
movement becomes rebellious.”282  We cannot completely detail the supporting elements 
of Hafez’s argument here.  But, the findings he details in Why Muslims Rebel as well as 
those presented in the book Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach 
illustrate the more complex and sufficient explanations for rebellion in Muslim states 
than those presented by Gurr and Hoffer. 
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 2. Strategic Development Issues 
As we discussed in Chapter Two, FM 3-24 contends that LLOs  
can be customized, renamed, changed altogether, or simply not used.  
LLOs should be used to isolate the insurgency from the population, 
address and correct the root causes of the insurgency, and create or 
reinforce the societal systems required to sustain the legitimacy of the HN 
government.283 
Based on our findings this assertion is problematic because it implies that LLOs have 
equal importance and omission of one of these strategies can and should be based on a 
commander’s assessments.  Each of our case studies and the contemporary SMT works 
discussed above indicate that omitting or insufficiently employing the “Governance” 
LLO is severely damaging to COIN campaigns.  While subordinating this LLO to others 
during the conduct of COIN a campaign maybe necessary at certain stages, doing so 
without reintegrating it into the campaign and making it a priority almost guarantees 
failure.  In fact, this is asserted in the manual. The FM acknowledges the necessity of 
“eliminate[ing] the root causes of the insurgency” in order to achieve lasting stability and 
security.284  It also maintains that “[g]ood governance is normally a key requirement to 
achieve legitimacy of the HN government.”285  If these assertions are true, than omitting, 
subordinating, or ignoring HN political development, except as a temporary measure, is 
unacceptable if one plans to execute a successful COIN campaign that produces 
sustainable stability and a legitimate government.  With this said, the “Governance” LLO 
appears to be a necessary strategy in any COIN campaign.  
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS    
1. Primacy of Political Inclusion 
Based on the evidence detailed above, leaders planning COIN campaigns must 
focus on emphasizing the rule of law and ensure political inclusion is an integral part of 
their strategic planning in COIN.  This assertion may seem obvious to most and possibly 
not groundbreaking in terms of understanding the COIN environment.  But, as leaders 
attempt to prioritize efforts in COIN campaigns with limited resources and under political 
pressure to achieve results, it would seem prudent to focus on the roots of contention in 
order to resolve it.  FM 3-24 acknowledges this.  Yet, as we have discussed, it fails to 
identify the “Governance” LLO as a necessary element of all COIN campaigns.  We do 
not contend that including this LLO in a COIN campaign is sufficient for success.  But, 
based on the evidence in contemporary SMT and our case studies, ensuring this LLO is 
fully developed and implemented is a necessary condition for success in COIN.  
2. Establish a Corp of Political Officers 
With the realization through our analysis of the primacy of political inclusion as a 
necessary element of a COIN campaign, the Army needs to make institutional changes to 
support strategic, operational, and tactical success in this area.  Up to this point, including 
our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the main effort in attempting to achieve 
political inclusion has been performed by Army and Marine officers with no formal 
training in a political science curriculum that prepares them to assist the HN develop 
good governance.  While there have been some efforts at the national level that have the 
assistance of the State Department, there are far too few State Department officers 
available to have the needed impact at the tactical level.  In fact, the tactical, or grass 
roots level, is where effective and legitimate governance begin.  This is the decisive level 
for COIN.  In an effort to combat the shortage of trained officers needed to handle grass 
roots political inclusion on a wide scale, we recommend that the Army develop a corps of 
political officers to handle this role.   
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The role of the political officer was of primary importance to the British 
campaigns in Iraq and Palestine, as well as the French effort in Algeria.  The SAS 
officers in Algeria were very successful at beginning the necessary political inclusion to 
garner the support of the local population.  While this was not their only role, it was one 
that had a positive impact on the direction of the French campaign.  As we have 
discussed, British political officers in Iraq had decisive effects on the development of the 
Iraqi state institutions.  Although, their role was decidedly disruptive to the development 
of a legitimate Iraqi government, it is reasonable to assert that if the British had adopted 
more inclusive political policies, then the political officers would have been instrumental 
in establishing a stable, secure and legitimate Iraqi government.  
The U.S. Army corps of political officers should be educated in the techniques of 
establishing local governance, supervising elections, and establishing civil 
administrations.  In addition, they should work in cooperation with U.S Army Civil 
Affairs officers.  These two branches could work together to establish local governance in 
conjunction with building local infrastructure.  Political officers would be billeted at 
every level of the Army down to the Battalion level, to correspond with the different 
levels of government in order to ensure continuity in employing the “Governance” LLO. 
Whether the HN government institutions are based on the U. S. system, or a different one 
that is linked to local preferences and historical precedents, political officers could assist 
this development and focus U.S. forces’ strategies to support the HN’s efforts.  Much like 
the career path of civil affairs officers, this branch could be a functional area designation 
once the officer reaches his fifth year of service.  The establishment of a corps of political 
officers would go a long way toward bridging the current gap between the few trained 
State Department officials that are supposed to fill this billet, and the untrained Army 
officer conducting operations in his sector while simultaneously attempting to establish 
some semblance of local governance.   
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3. Seal the Borders to Gain Control 
The establishment of a stable and secure environment, or common MOE, is the 
standard of success for COIN campaigns that we have been using throughout this thesis.  
With this goal in mind, one lesson that seemed to come out of all of our case studies was 
the necessity to gain control of state’s borders.  Control over the border provides many 
advantages for the COIN forces, not the least of which is the denial of material and men 
to the insurgency.  As Leites and Wolf espoused in their RAND study on COIN “what an 
insurgent movement requires for successful and expanding operations is not popular 
support….but rather a steady supply of certain inputs.”286   
If one looks at the men and material supplied to the insurgency as inputs, then this 
theory has obvious applicability.  In the Algerian case study, the impact of sealing the 
country’s borders had on the insurgency is readily apparent.  Prior to the establishment of 
the Morice line, approximately 1000 weapons a month were flowing into Algeria from 
Morocco and Tunisia, as well as unknown numbers of supporters.  As a result, the FLN 
was fighting a successful insurgent campaign.287  Once the border was sealed, “the FLN 
was deprived of much of the weapons, fresh manpower, and essential logistics that it 
needed,”288 and the French gained the advantage.   
A similar effect can also be seen in Israel with the establishment of the security 
fence around the occupied territories.  However, in this case it was not the denial of 
inputs to the insurgency that mattered; rather it was the denial of targets.  As our graphs 
in the Chapter on Israel indicate, the construction of the barrier had a dramatic impact on 
the number of attacks that the Palestinians were able to carry out in Israel, and therefore 
Israeli casualty numbers dropped dramatically.  While the fence around the occupied 
territories has not stopped violence in Israel and the terrorists have found ways around it,   
violence has decreased to a level acceptable to the Israeli government.   
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